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INTRODUCTION TO HIGH PROFI.E CASES

Cases involving shocking crimes,1 parental child abuse,2 toxic and
deadly products, 3 famous people,4 public figures,5 environmental damage, 6
child custody wars,7 and other subjects attract massive and pervasive media
coverage. A ready public may decry such media coverage while following

1. See, e.g., United States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d. 806 (10th Cir. 1997) (challenging right
of press access to documents related to the Oklahoma City bombing trial); United States v.
Salameh, 992 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1993) (barring counsel from publicly discussing a case related to
the World Trade Center bombing); Wuornos v. Florida, 676 So. 2d 966, 968 n.2 (Fla. 1995)
(upholding the conviction of killer Aileen C. Wuornos despite her claim that she could not receive
a fair trial due to the press accounts and "a movie portraying the various killings in which she was
implicated").
2. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989)
(discussing abuse of a boy who was permanently injured by his father); Department of Health &
Rehab. Servs. v. Yamuni, 529 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1988) (discussing abuse of a toddler by his natural
mother); see also,e.g., Chuck Chynoweth et al., HorrifiedDriversWatch Mom Drop Totfrom Car,
MIAMI HERALD, February 20, 1998, at 5B (reporting that an 18-month old infant was dropped or
thrown by his mother from a speeding car onto an interstate highway in Florida which prompted
hundreds of callers from across the nation and around the world to offer the boy help or an adoptive
home).
3. See, e.g., Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 740 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1984) (discussing
injuries allegedly caused by exposure to the drug DES); Broin v. Phillip Morris Cos., 641 So. 2d
888 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (discussing flight attendants' suit for damages from effects of second hand
cigarette smoke).
4. See, e.g., State v. William Kennedy Smith, Case No. 91-5482 A02 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1991);
Virginia v. Albert, Case Nos. CR 97-913 and CR 97-914 (Va. Dist. Ct. 1997). According to Roy
Black, Jr., Esq., who represented the defendants in these cases, "[mjassive publicity affect[ed] every
participant in the[se] case[s]: the lawyers, the parties, the jurors, thejudge, thejailers, the clerks and
others. There is a quantum difference in every aspect of the case-a different impact on the whole
system." Telephone interview with Roy Black, Jr., partner, Black, Srebnick & Komspan, P.A. (Feb.
28, 1998).
5. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997) (discussing sexual harassment lawsuit
by Paula Jones against President Clinton); United States v. McDougal, 103 F.3d 651 (8th Cir.
1996) (ruling on use of videotaped deposition by President Clinton); David E. Rovella, Perjury
Charge a Stretch, Say Nation's DAs, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 9, 1998, at Al (discussing the Monica
Lewinsky investigation).
6. See WILLIAM B. HIRSCH, Justice Delayed: Seven Years After the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill
and No End in Sight,in THE EXXONVALDEzDISASTER: READINGS ONA MODERNPROBLEM (1997)
(discussing the Exxon Valdes disaster, one of the largest and most ecologically destructive oil spills
in North American history); J. Steven Picou, CompelledDisclosureof ScholarlyResearch: Some
Comments on "High Stakes Litigation," 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149 (1996). Exxon's
settlement with the government and various civil law suits continue to attract substantial media
coverage. See id.
7. See, e.g., Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 37 F.3d 1541 (4th Cir. 1994) (discussing
highly publicized child custody case); Foretich v. CBS Inc., 619 A,2d 48 (D.C. 1993) (evaluating
a highly publicized child custody case). A LEXIS/NEXIS search revealed more than one thousand
news reports on the civil custody dispute between Dr. Eric Foretich and Dr. Elizabeth Morgan.
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every revelation. Suddenly, the cloak of indifference about the courts is
lifted. The public perception of the courts and the major issues they
confront is substantially impacted. In the broadest sense, a new image of
justice itself takes shape.
Unlike the reality of everyday life, we expect our justice system to
guarantee fairness and equality. Is our justice system racially fair? Does
money control the ruling on the verdict? Does our adversarial system, with
our procedural rules and constitutional protections, so distort the search for
the truth that few have confidence that cases will be decided on their
merits? Clearly, the public's perceptions of high profile cases influence
their answers to these pressing questions.
The courts and their commentators are increasingly recognizing the
need for judges to effectively manage high profile cases because of their

ability to affect public confidence in the justice system. Both the
American Bar Association9 and the National Center for State Courts10 have
invested time and treasure to address this need. Moreover, scholars from
both the law and court management disciplines have contributed
theoretical and empirical articles on high profile cases.'

8. In May 1996, the "National Conference on the Media and the Courts: Working Together
to Serve the American People" was held at the national Judicial College in Reno, Nevada. At the
conference, journalists, judges, and legal experts examined, criticized, and debated each other's
professions, then agreed on steps to improve the quality ofjustice and court coverage. Of note was
a recommendation calling for the establishment in each jurisdiction of local guidelines for
management in high profile cases. See Vol. XI, No. 3, MJC Alumni, (Summer 1996).
9.
In the autumn of 1995, then ABA President Roberta Cooper Ramo, recognizing
how important high-profile cases are in influencing the image of the justice
system, urged that the American Bar Association provide assistance in managing
such cases. After discussions with participants in prominent trials, in spring 1996
the Board of Governors created a resource team
for high profile trials. Robert A. Stein, Help in High-ProfileTrials, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1997, at 93. The
team does not provide substantive or strategic advice but does offer resources on media
management, security issues, and pretrial and trial issues influenced by media coverage. See id
10. The National Center for State Courts (NCSC) published a manual to assist judges and
court administrators in planning for, and managing, notorious cases in 1992. Project staff developed
the manual after visiting and studying notorious criminal and civil trials in both small and large
jurisdictions. The project staff was aided by an advisory committee, whose members made
themselves readily available for guidance and assistance throughout the project. One of the authors
served on this committee. The manual, which is currently under revision, has been of great

assistance to the authors.
11. See, e.g., Akhil R. Amar, Sixth Amendment FirstPrinciples,84 GEo. L.J. 641, 641
(1996); Eugene Cerruti, "Dancing in the Courthouse": The FirstAmendment Right of Access
Opens a New Round, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 237, 237 (1995); Adrian Cronaver, The FirstAnnual
Symposium on Media and The Law: Free Speech v. FairTrial,41 S.D. L. REV. 74,79-130 (1996);
Robert Hardaway & Douglas B. Tumminello, PretrialPublicity in CriminalCases of National
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What kinds of special issues arise in these cases? What should a court
do to address them? Obviously, preparations for judicial management of
these cases must begin by quickly identifying a case as a "high profile"
case. The selection of the judge who will preside over the case, deciding
which courthouse, courtroom and other facilities are suitable for the media
and spectators who will descend upon them, and determining what special
procedures regulating their use will be needed to accommodate everyone
are all pressing issues. The court should give specific consideration to
whether it will permit television coverage of pretrial hearings and of the
trial, and if so, under what restrictions. The normal jury pool may be totally
inadequate for cases that will take months to try, involving atypical parties
and intense media coverage with the looming specter of lengthy jury
sequestration.
A judge who is assigned to preside over a high profile case should
expect to be confronted with explosive free press and fair trial issues even
before the first scheduled hearing. Should access to judicial hearings be
closed to prevent prejudicial pretrial publicity? Should gag orders be
issued, and if so, what should their scope be? Exactly where is the line
between the public's right to know and the parties' right to a fair trial?
These are issues to be decided under the glare of television lights and the
ever present photojournalist.
Massive publicity often generates motions for change of venue. The
defense urges a new venue, the prosecution looks for the home court

Notoriety; Constructinga Remedyfor the Remediless Wrong, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 39,39-90(1996);
William J. Harte, Why Make Justice a Circus? The O.J. Simpson, Dahmerand Kennedy-Smith
DebaclesMake the CaseAgainst Cameras in the Courtroom, 39 TRIALLAW. GUIDE 379, 379-421
(1996); Albert J. Kreiger, Reflections on O.1. After Two Aspirin andaGood Night'sSleep, CRIM.
JUST. BuL., Winter 1996, at 2; Leonard Pertnoy, The Juror'sNeed to Know v. The Constitutional
Right to FairTrial,97 DICK. L. REV. 627, 627-54 (1993); Harvey K. Sepler, Where Do We Stand
on Camerasin the Courtroom?,70 FLA. B.J. 113, 113-14 (1996); Nadine Strossen, Free Pressand
FairTrial: Implications ofthe O.1. Simpson Case, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 647, 647-54 (1995); Robert
C. Weaver, Jr., Sixth Amendment at Peril: The Media Frenzy Surrounding the Tonya Harding
Cases,4 KAN. J.L. &PUB. POL'Y 53,53-60 (1995); Charles H. Whitebread & Darrell W. Contreras,
Free Pressv. FairTrial: Protectingthe CriminalDefendant'sRights in a Highly PublicizedTrial
byApplying the Sheppard-Mu'MinRemedy, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1587, 1587-626 (1996); Brian V.
Breheny & Elizabeth M. Kelly, Note, MaintainingImpartiality:Does Media Coverage of Trials
Need to Be Curtailed?,10 ST. JOHN'SJ. LEGALCOMMENT. 371,371-402 (1995); Megan J. Conboy
& Alice R. Scott, Note, Tipping the Scales of Justice:An Attempt to Balance the Right to a Fair
Trial With the Right to Free Speech, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 775, 775-803 (1996);
Stephen J. Krause, Note, Punishingthe Press: Using Contempt of Court to Secure the Right to a
FairTrial, 76 B.U.L. REV. 537,537 (1996); Jonathan M. Remshak, Comment, Truth, Justice,and
the Media: An Analysis of the Public CriminalTrial,6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1083, 1083-116
(1996); Robert S. Stephen, Note, PrejudicialPublicity
Surroundinga CriminalTrial: What a Trial
Court Can Do to Ensure a FairTrial in the Face of a "Media Circus," 26 SUFFOLK U.L. REV.
1063,1066, n.1l (1992).
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advantage and the governmental entity funding the cost of the trial
struggles to pay the cost of a budget busting bill for a four-week trial at the
far end of the state. The search for jury bias or jury neutrality means
probing questions far beyond the norm. Issues ofjuror privacy and security
intersect with the right to a fair trial.
This Article will comprehensively address these issues with particular
reference to high profile cases that have been recently tried or are pending
at the time of this writing. While it focuses on judges' attempts to impose
order and reason upon these difficult cases, it goes beyond the specific to
suggest some concepts that are generally applicable to this class of
litigation.
I. PRELIMINARY MATIERS TO BE DEALT WITH UPON
COMMENCEMENT OF HIGH PROFILE LITIGATION

A. Introduction
The onset of saturation publicity frequently precedes the filing of a high
profile case, signaling the necessity for court officers to begin preparations
to handle the extraordinary judicial management problems that such cases
generate. Although a civil case does, in some instances, give rise to such
massive publicity, it is frequently the criminal case involving well known
defendants or bizarre or gruesome facts that generate sensational attention
in both the tabloid and mainstream press.12 In describing the public
fascination with the Jon Benet Ramsay case, Dave Mazarilla, editor of
U.S.A. Today, explained that his paper has written about this murder
investigation because "[the] victim was in the spotlight, the family was
prominent and the circumstances [were] bizarre."1 3 He questioned whether
the media would have "devoured the story with the same hearty appetite"

12. Many recent cases, such as the O.J. Simpson trial,
differ from their predecessors to the extent that the tabloid media has both
expanded the size of the audience following the trial and increased the competition
amongst the various members of the tabloid and mainstream press to gather new
information about the case. The net effect of these factors have been to exacerbate
the chaotic atmosphere criticized in the case law.
Eileen A. Minnefor, Lookingfor Fair Trialsin the InformationAge: The Needfor More Stringent
Gag OrdersAgainstTrial Participants,30 U.S.F. L.REV.95, 97, n.8 (1995). See also MURPHY ET
AL, A MANUAL FOR MANAGING NOTORIoUS CASES, ch.3 (identification of pretrial matters in
sensational cases tracking many of the issued discussed infra).
13. Stacy Jones, Covering the Death of a Beauty Queen, EDrrOR&PUBLUSHER, Feb. 1, 1997,
at 8,9.
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without "the [victim's] blond hair and fairy-tale existence." 4
Once a high profile case is filed, the court must be prepared to begin the
decisionmaking process necessary to effectively address the issues and
problems discussed below.
B. JudicialSelection
Upon the commencement of high profile litigation, one of the most
important preliminary matters to be dealt with is the selection of the "right
judge" to handle the case. This was forcefully recognized by the recent
observation that "the circus-free, no-nonsense trial of convicted Oklahoma
City bomber, Timothy McVeigh... proves that if you have a bright,
prepared judge who maintains control of the courtroom, the system will
work."15 Ordinarily, "the assignment or reassignment of specific court
cases between or among the judges of a multi-judge court is a matter
within the internal government of that court," and "a litigant does not have
standing to enforce internal court policy" with respect to the assignment of
judges. 6 Should the wrong judge be assigned to try a case, it may be
difficult to remove that judge absent evidence of judicial misconduct.
Unless blind filing is required by court rule,17 it is desirable for the
14. Id. Extensive publicity often produces charges that parties are attempting to manipulate
the outcome of a case through use of the media. For example, one commentator made the cynical
observation that ever since Paula Jones sued President Clinton for sexual harassment in 1994, the
President and his lawyers "orchestrated a media blitz depicting Jones as a gold-digging slut whose
allegations are 'tabloid trash' to delay or frustrate the prosecution. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Her Case
Against Clinton, AM. LAW. Nov. 1996, at 12.
15. Ryan Ross,McVeigh's TrialLeanandTrim, A.B.A.J.July 1997, at 24; see alsoTIMOTHY
R. MURPHY ET AL, A MANUAL FOR MANAGING NoTORious CASES 4 (1992) (stressing the
importance of trial judge selection).
16. Kruckenberg v. Powell, 422 So. 2d 994, 995 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); see also Peoples v.
Fulcomer, 731 F. Supp. 1242, 1245 (E.D. Pa. 1990). However, the judicial officer making the
selection decision should not be motivated by impermissible considerations. See Cruz v. Abbate,
812 F.2d 571,574 (9th Cir. 1987).
17. See People v. Bell, 659 N.Y.S.2d 713,.715 (Sup. Ct. 1997). Where court rules require
assignment of cases on a blind filing basis and a high profile case is assigned to ajudge who is not
well suited to handle it, administrative judges should provide special assistance to the judge. This
should include special training, conferences with other judges who have presided over sensational
trials or similar difficult litigation, intensive staff legal assistance, and other assistance designed to
compensate for the assigned judge's lack of experience or other limitations. In extreme cases,
reassignment of the case may be necessary, but it may be very difficult to achieve. The assigned
judge would be embarrassed if the court made an exception to the blind filing rule on the grounds
that the assigned judge was not suitable to preside over the case. To avoid this difficulty, the court
should have a provision in its blind filing rules that administrative judges will make judicial
assignment of high profile cases based upon criteria such as seniority, judicial experience, special
knowledge of the legal issues likely to be involved in the case, and other relevant considerations.
Moreover, other judicial management concerns such as judicial back loads make flexibility
desirable in the assignment of a high profile case.
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selecting authority to assign or reassign" a judge qualified by training,19
experience, and temperament to preside over a high profile case. Serious
consideration should be given to assigning a judge who has successfully
handled a high profile case. If this is not feasible, a judge who has
demonstrated excellence in presiding over difficult, highly contentious
litigation should be selected. The judge chosen should be one who
understands the importance of working with administrative judges and
court personnel in the preparation and trial of the case.
While a single judge should be assigned to handle a case from start to
finish,21 the assignment of a back-up judge in a lengthy trial who can take
over in the event the presiding judge is unavailable, due to sickness or
death, is advisable. For example, during the O.J. Simpson civil trial, the
state utilized a two-judge trial team. A specially selected judge managed
the logistical and public affairs aspects of the trial,22 while a randomly
selected judge presided over the trial itself. This "tandem" approach has
the added benefit of providing an opportunity for less experienced judges
to work with and be "mentored" by more seasoned trial judges. Although
judges should comply with the assignment directives of the chief judge or
other assigning judge, an unwilling judge should ordinarily not be forced
to try a high profile case against his or her wishes.' 3

18. See Hughes v. Bedsole, 913 F. Supp. 420,423 (E.D.N.C. 1994); State v. Eastlack, 883
P.2d 999 (Ariz. 1994).
19. Floridajudicial rules state:
The chiefjudge shall ensure that no judge presides over a capital case in which
the state is seeking the death penalty or collateral proceedings brought by a death

row inmate until that judge has served a minimum of 6 months in a felony criminal
division and has successfully completed the "Handling Capital Cases" course
offered through the Florida College of Advanced Judicial Studies .... The chief
justice may waive the course requirement in exceptional circumstances at the
request of the chief judge.
FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.050(b)(10).
20. The judge selected to preside over a high profile case must be prepared to deal with a
variety of extrajudicial pressures from a variety of public institutions and private interests. See
Maurice D. Geiger & Kathryn Fahnestock, Local Judicial Independence: An Endangered Species,
JUDGES' J. Winter 1997, at 24.
21. See La Seigneurie U.S. Holdings, Inc. v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 175, 177 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1994).
22. The Honorable Douglas David Perez, Presiding Judge of the Los Angeles County
Superior Court, personally handled the management of the case. See Nat'l Ctr. for State Courts
Manual 4 (tentative draft) (on file with author).
23. See In re J. Avellino, 690 A.2d 1144, 1145 (Pa. 1997).
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C. CourthouseFacilities
The physical surroundings in which a high profile case is tried can
significantly affect the conduct ofthe participants, the media, and members
of the public attending the trial. If the courtroom is too small, for example,
a crowded, tense atmosphere can result as well as fierce competition for the
limited seating. Competition for seating can become particularly sensitive
when members of the media seek preferential seating to the disadvantage
or exclusion of members of the public. To enhance judicial management
and the dignity and decorum of a high profile trial, court managers should
provide courthouse facilities, equipment, and personnel appropriate to meet
the needs of the trial.
1. Courtroom Assignment
Courtrooms assigned for the trial of a high profile case24
must be comfortable and.., quiet. There must be sanitary
restrooms. No participant in court should be required to
endure physical discomfort. The courtroom must be properly
ventilated, properly heated in cold weather, and properly
cooled in hot weather. The chairs must be of sufficient
comfort so that lawyers, parties, courtroom personnel, and
jurors, who are required to sit for long periods, can do so
without physical unease. Since court proceedings are public,
there must also be sufficient space and chairs or benches
provided for spectators and press.2
Additionally, some cases require that the courtroom be equipped with
technological features allowing for the remote presentation of evidence,
including video-conferencing facilities, computer graphic displays,
television monitors for jurors, and computers for counsel and the judge.
2. Juror Accommodations
Juror accommodations, at a minimum, should comply with the
Americans with Disabilities Act and otherwise be sufficient to make jury
24. In many courts, the assignment of courtrooms is regulated by Administrative Order of the
Chief Judge. See, e.g., FRA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.050(b). It may be necessary to switch or vary
courtroom assignments during high profile cases, or to make physical modifications to the
courtroom to allow for storage of audio-visual aids and exhibits.
25. Hosford v. State, 525 So. 2d 789,797 n.4 (Miss. 1998). Itis important that the courtroom
selected for the trial of a high profile case provide sufficient access for disabled persons. For
example, a courtroom with stationary seating could have an area cleared for exclusive use by
wheelchair users. See John Albrecht, Changingthe Courts Underthe Americans With Disabilities
Act, JUDGES' J., Spring 1996, at 14, 20.
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service pleasant.26 Minimum standards for jury facilities and juror
treatment have been proposed.27
If the jurors selected to hear the case are not sequestered, special
arrangements for their transportation to and from their homes and the jury
room in the courthouse may help shield them from outside influences. It
may be desirable for court personnel to transport them between these
locations. Court personnel should receive training on transporting jurors,
and should be given strict instructions to avoid any improper statements or
inappropriate conduct. Thejurors should be aware ofthese instructions and
should report any violations to the judge. The judge should consider
rotating the personnel assigned to transportjurors, especially in a long trial.
3. Broadcast Facilities
In Chandlerv. Florida,28 the United States Supreme Court held that a
defendant's due process rights were not violated by Florida's rule
permitting the televising of their trials, and that Florida's guidelines for
television broadcasts afforded adequate safeguards to protect the right of
an accused to a fair trial.29 States are accordingly permitted (but are not
obliged) to televise trials subject to the limitations stated in Chandlerand
other cases. 3' The court in which a high profile case is filed may be either
required or authorized by court rule to permit the televising of all or part
of the trial.3 If the trial is to be televised, space within the courthouse for
television and monitoring equipment should be made available. Guidelines
governing location and type of broadcasting equipment permitted should
also be prepared,32 including directives as to pool coverage both inside, as
well as outside, the courtroom. 33 Those responsible for allocating space and
maintaining the building should know of these needs as far in advance of
the scheduled trial date as possible.

26. See G. Thomas Munsterman, A Brief History of State Jury Reform Efforts, 79
JUDICATURE 216, 219 (1996).
27. See James Needham, A Citizen'sSuggestionfor Minimum Standardsfor Jury Facilities
and JurorTreatment,JUDGES' J., Fall 1997, at 32, 32-34.
28. 449 U.S. 560, 582 (1981).
29. See id. at 582; see also State v. Green, 395 So. 2d 532, 535 (Fla. 1981) (prohibiting
electronic media coverage of trial where doing so may render defendant incompetent to stand trial);
Charles R. Nesson & Andrew D. Koblenz, The Image of Justice: Chandler v. Florida, 16 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 405,409 (1981) (stating televised trials may improve the public's image of the

judiciary).
30. See Chandler,449 U.S. at 582; Green, 395 So.2d at 535.
31. See Chandler,449 U.S. at 566.
32. See FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.170 (regulating the type and location of broadcasting

equipment).
33. See, e.g., Broin v. Phillip Morris Cos., No. 97-49738 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1997); Policy for
Media Conduct within Court During Tobacco Trial (June 1, 1997) (on file with author).
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D. Jury Pool Considerations
The court should plan in advance to summon a sufficient number of
jurors on the date a high profile trial is scheduled to commence. To
minimize the burden on citizens and the cost to the court, the number of
prospective jurors summoned should not exceed the number that is
reasonably necessary, taking into account such factors as the size of the
jury panel desired for trial, the nature of the case, the source list from
which jurors are drawn,3" and the number of jurors likely to be excused.36
The court should summon enough persons, however, so that it will not run
out of prospective jurors in the course of the selection process.37 In this
regard, a 1997 report of a judicial oversight group that studied the
functioning of the jury systems in the federal and local courts of the
District of Columbia, found that nearly twenty percent of the city's
residents chose to ignore their jury summons.38 Moreover, less than onequarter of citizens summoned were actually qualified and available forjury
service.39 The report pointed to citizen apathy and inaccurate juror source
lists as the primary factors causing this low juror yield.4
Highly publicized cases often demand an extended voir dire and
engender substantial delays in the jury selection process; however, the
court can avoid delays with proper planning. The effective use of jury
questionnaires to eliminate unlikely candidates may help save the court and
legal counsel time and effort.
Jury pool procedures should be established and carefully reviewed with
34. The court may in some jurisdictions draw jurors from other localities where prejudicial
publicity has been concentrated in a given area. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 910.03(3) (1997).
35. The U.S. Supreme Court has set clear guidelines to ensure that jurors are drawn from a
faircross section of society. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,538 (1975). In Taylor,the
Court held that "petit juries must be drawn from a source fairly representative of the community."
Id. To that end, "jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires from which juries are drawn must
not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably
representative thereof." Id.at 538 (emphasis added).
36. Since many prospective jurors are unwilling to put their families, careers and possibly
their salaries on hold, it is realistic to expect a substantial number ofjurors to request to be excused
from service in high profile cases of long duration.
37. For example, in Palm Beach, Florida, notices were sent to 1,500 potentialjurors to appear
for selection in the state's lawsuit against major tobacco companies. See Lori Rosza, Tobacco's
"Holy War" Begins Today, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 1, 1997, at 5b. The jurors summoned were
broken up into groups and given questionnaires to "help attorneys weed out unlikely candidates."
Id.
38. See Council for Court Excellence, Juriesfor the Year 2000 andBeyond: Proposalsto
Improve the Jury System in Washington, D.C., cited in Eileen J.Williams, D.C. Jury Reform
ProjectRecommends Bigger JurorRole, FewerPeremptories,66 U.S.L.W. 2517 (1998).
39. See id.
40. See id.
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all personnel expected to come into contact with the prospective jurors.
This will ensure that such personnel do not intentionally or inadvertently
do or say anything that could prejudice the parties' right to a fair trial.
E. Conduct of Spectators andMedia
Since "courts have the inherent power to preserve order and decorum
in the courtroom,41 . .. and generally to further the administration of
justice,"'4 2 the courts should prepare directives in high profile cases relating
to the seating and conduct of the media43 and spectators in the courtroom,
and the insulation of jurors and witnesses from the press during the trial
period.' Limiting access to jury pool areas is particularly advised to avoid
the possibility of jury tampering. 45
F. Guidelinesfor Press Coverage
Well in advance of the trial, the court should adopt voluntary
guidelines' for press coverage of high profile cases with the consent of the
parties and the media, if possible.47 In developing these guidelines, the

41. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Lewis, 426 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1982). The function of a
courtroom is to provide a locus in which civil and criminal disputes can be adjudicated. "Within
this staid environment, the presiding judge is charged with the responsibility of maintaining proper

order and decorum." Bemer v. Delahanty, 129 F.3d 20,26 (lst Cir. 1997).
42. MiamiHeraldPubl'gCo., 426 So. 2d at 3; People v. Pennisi, 563 N.Y.S.2d 612,614-15
(Sup. CL 1990).
43. Since courtrooms have limited seating capacity, there may be occasions when not every
person who wishes to attend can be accommodated. In such situations, preferential seating for
media representatives may be appropriate. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S.
554,583, n.18 (1980).

44. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 359 (1966).
45. See Tumey v. State, 936 P.2d 533, 539 (Alaska 1997). For a discussion of the activities
of The Fully Informed Jury Association, see Fredric B. Rodgers, The Jury in Revolt? A "Heads
Up" on the Fully Informed Jury AssociationComing Soon to a Courthousein YourArea, JUDGES'

J., Summer 1996, at 10, 10-12.
46. Voluntary bench-bar-press guidelines have been adopted in various states. See Charles
H. Sheldon et al., The Effect of Voluntary Bench-Bar-PressGuideline on ProfessionalAttitudes
Towardthe FreePress,Privacy,andFairTrialValues, 72 JUDICATURE 114,114-21 (1998). These
guidelines are voluntary standards adopted by members of the state bar and news media to deal with
the reporting of crimes and criminal trials. See id.at 115.
47. At the National Judicial College in Reno, Nevada, on May 29-31, 1996, journalists,
judges, and legal experts examined, criticized, and debated each other's professions, then agreed
on steps to improve the quality of justice and court coverage. Of note was the recommendation
calling for the establishment in each jurisdiction of a bench/bar/media committee that will meet
regularly to address issues of mutual concern. Also recommended was the establishment of local
guidelines for management in high-profile cases. Court officials should confer and consult with
media representatives to avoid unanticipated problems and understand each other's legal
constraints. These measures represent a first step in addressing the issues.
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parties should consider the Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ) new
Code of Ethics for Journalists which advises journalists to distinguish
"news reporting" from advocacy while "balanc[ing] a criminal suspect's
fair trial rights with the public's right to be informed."4'
G. Security
Since court related violence seems to have increased over recent years,
many courts prohibit persons frombringing weapons into the courthouse,"
and check those who enter for weapons by using hand searches, X-ray
screening devices, or walk-through magnetometers.50 To ensure the safety
of all persons on courthouse property, and to prevent escape of prisoners,
additional security measures are advisable. Security should be as
unobtrusive as possible to avoid an atmosphere which might interfere with
a defendant's right to a fair trial.51 In assessing the various day-to-day
security concerns in high profile cases,judges should consult with the U.S.
Marshall's Service or other similar court agencies.52
II. ACCESS TO JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AND DOCUMENTS
In addition to handling the preliminary matters previously discussed,
effective judicial handling of high profile cases53requires the resolution of
issues arising from the demands of the public and the media under the First
Amendment. The court must resolve First Amendment issues regarding
access to judicial proceedings and court records, and must be prepared to
address assertions by one or more of the parties that access should be
denied in order to protect the right to a fair trial guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment. The law governing these issues will be discussed below.
48. DebraG. Hernandez,S.P.J.ApprovesEthicsCode, EDrTOR&PUBLISHER, Oct. 19,1996,
at 51. Separate standards of conduct for lawyers serving as public commentators on high profile
cases also have been proposed. See Michael Higgins, Rules to Talk By, 84A.B.A.J. 20, 20 (1998).
49. See, e.g., People v. Swihart, 897 P.2d 822, 823 (Colo. 1995).
50. See, e.g., Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 866 F.2d 1185, 1218 (10th Cir. 1989) (deciding
security measures including armed and unarmed guards and magnetometer were not so inherently
prejudicial as to pose unacceptable threat to defendant's right to a fair trial).
51. See CourtSecurityand the TransportationofPrisoners,NAT'LINST. JUST. J., June 1997,
at 21-22; Kerry M. Healey, Victim and Witness Intimidation:New Developments and Emerging
Responses, NAT'L INST. JUST. J., Oct. 1995, at 5-8. For cases considering the constitutionality of
in-court security measures, see, for example, Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 572, (1986). See
also Morgan v. Aispuro, 946 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1991) (approving use of a secure courtroom
having a wire-reinforced glass partition and bars separating the spectator area from the court area).
52. See United States v. Pasciuti, 803 F. Supp. 568, 571 (D.N.H. 1992) (citing TIMOTHY R.
MURPHY ET AL., A MANUAL FOR MANAGING NoToRious CAsES (1992)).
53. The pendency of a criminal case for judicial purposes includes the period beginning with
the filing of an accusatory instrument against the accused and allappellate and collateral
proceedings. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 8-3.2 (2d ed. 1980).
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A. Defendant'sRight to Public Trial
The tradition of the public trial has deep roots in both English and
American History.5 4 Regarding criminal trials, the Sixth Amendment
specifically provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accusedshall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial..
.. "" Case law has uniformly
recognized the Sixth Amendment public trial guarantee as "one created for
the benefit of the defendant. 5' 6 In In re Oliver,5 7 the Supreme Court
explained:
[The public trial guarantee] "is for the protection of all
persons accused of crime-the innocently accused that they
may not become the victim of an unjust prosecution, as well
as the guilty, that they may be awarded a fair trial-that one
rule [as to public trials] must be observed and applied to all."
Frequently quoted is the statement: ... "The requirement of
a public trial is for the benefit of the accused; that the public
may see he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned,
and that the presence of interested spectators may keep his
triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility and to the
9258
importance of their functions ....
Numerous commentators also have recognized that only a defendant has
a right to a public trial under the Sixth Amendment.

9

B. PublicAccess to CriminalTrials
Historically, courts have not recognized an independent right of the
public and the press to attend criminal trials apart from the defendant's
6 ' the
right to a public trial.' Specifically, in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,
Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee to the accused
of a public trial gave neither the public nor the press an enforceable right

54. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266 (1948); see also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,596 (1980) (Brennan, ., concurring) (discussing tradition of public trials).
Celebrated by Hale, Blackstone, and Bentham, openness has come to be seen as "an indispensable
attribute of an Anglo-American trial," which assures the accused a fair trial and "discourage[s]
perjury, the misconduct of participants, and decisions based on secret bias or partiality." Id. at 570.
55. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
56. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380 (1979).
57. 333 U.S. 257 (1948).

58. Id. at 270 n.25 (citation omitted).
59. See Gannett,443 U.S. at 381 n.8.
60. See id. at 391.
61. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
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of access to a pretrial suppression hearing.62 However, the Court in Gannett
reserved the question whether the First Amendment gives the press and the
public a right of access to criminal proceeding that is independent of the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to insist on the openness of the
proceedings.63
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,64 the Supreme Court
answered the above question and decided that the First Amendment gives
the press and public a qualified right of access to criminal trials.' Basing
its decision on the common law presumption of open trials, the Court
found an implied right of access to criminal trials through the First
Amendment guarantees of free press, free speech, and the right of
assembly. 6 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the right to publish what
occurs during a trial would become all but meaningless if the press were
denied access to a trial.67 The Court, however, asserted that this right of
access was not absolute and is subject to reasonable limitations.68
First Amendment access claims derive from the underlying notion that
the First Amendment is a check on government. As Justice Brandeis
famously observed: "Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants. 69
Also, James Madison, the principal author of the First Amendment, stated:
"A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of
acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both."7
This is the thought the Court implicitly had in mind, in deciding in
Richmond Newspapers, its first-ever, flat-out holding applying the First
Amendment as a sword (supporting a right of public and press to access
government-controlled sources of information) and not merely as a shield
(protection from the government when it seeks to suppress what one may
report or say).71 As Justice Stevens observed in his Richmond Newspapers
concurrence: 'This is a watershed case. Until today the Court has accorded
virtually absolute protection to the dissemination of information or ideas,
62. See id. at 391.
63. See id. at 392.
64. 488 U.S. 555 (1980).
65. See id. at 573-74.
66. See id. at 575.
67. See id. at 577-78.
68. See id. at 581 n.18. Ostensibly, the United States Supreme Court has thus far declined to
recognize the press as having any different, or better, claims than other members of the public to
First Amendment access. As a matter of practice, courts do make a distinction between the public
and the press by making various accommodations such as providing preferred seating and screened
film-recording facilities.
69. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (quoting Louis BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S
MONEY [sic] 62 (1933)).
70. JAMES MADISON, THE WRITINGS OFJAMES MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunted., 1910).
71. See generallyRichmondNewspapers,488 U.S. at555 (granting public and press alimited
right to observe criminal trials).
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but never before has it squarely held that the acquisitionof newsworthy
matter is entitled to any constitutionalprotection whatsoever."72
This constitutional right of access is satisfied by allowing the press to
attend the trial and report what they have heard.7 3 However, there is no
constitutional right to have testimony recorded and broadcast.7 4 Even if a
right of access attaches, closure of the courtroom may still be permissible
where a court finds that closure is essential to preserve higher values and
is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.7'
C. Proceedingto Which a FirstAmendment
Right of Access Attaches
While emphasizing that access decisions should be made on a case-bycase basis,7 6 the United States Supreme Court suggested that when
deciding whether a First Amendment right of access attaches, lower courts
should apply a two-prong test. The court must decide, first, whether the
proceeding has historically been open to the press and general public (the
history prong), and second, whether public access plays a significant
positive role in the functioning of the particular proceeding (the logic
prong).' If a particular proceeding passes both prongs of the test, the court
will conclude that a qualified First Amendment right of access exists.78
In some respects, the history prong conflicts with the logic prong.
While the history prong sanctions the continued secrecy of certain judicial
proceedings, it remains that openness promotes the general goals of a given
proceeding and helps keep the public informed. The history prong also
appears to conflict with the Madisonian explanation that views the First
Amendment access claim as a means of providing a check on government
and a method of witnessing how it conducts itself. This tension creates
substantial doubts about the long term viability of the history prong.

72. I. at 582 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
73. See id at 555.
74. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 610 (1978); Westmoreland
v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16,24 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that the First Amendment,
while guaranteeing a public right of access to criminal trials, does not guarantee the right to view
them on television).
75. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984); Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982).
76. See Globe NewspaperCo., 457 U.S. at 609.
77. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 478 U.S. 1, 11-13, (1986); United
States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 812 (10th Cir. 1997).
78. See Press-Enterprise,478 U.S. at 14. The Supreme Court has recognized that the press
and public have acoextensive constitutional right of access to criminal trials, deriving from the First
Amendment and applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, as in the
privacy context, a number of states have constitutional provisions guaranteeing court access, which
in some circumstances provide greater protection than that mandated under the federal constitution.
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Recognizing the problematic nature of the history prong, Judge Kimba M.
Wood has stated that courts need to refocus the analysis
away from history and take a fresh look at first, where public
access matters the most; second, whether access needs to be
contemporaneous, or could, for example, be afforded equally
well by videotapes made available after interests in closure
have diminished or vanished; and last, whether new
procedures can effectively accommodate First Amendment,
and Sixth Amendment interests when
Fourth Amendment
79
they diverge.
1. Criminal Trials
"[T]he First Amendment confers an enforceable right of access to
criminal trials upon the press and general public."8 Additionally, the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of a public trial" implicates the right of the press
and public to attend a criminal trial.8 2 The right of access to criminal trials
is generally held to apply to the entire trial, including voir dire, 3 opening
statements, presentation of evidence, closing arguments, instructions to the
jury, return of the verdict, and the penalty phase.' There is, however, no
right of access to jury deliberations85 or conferences between the court and
counsel.86
2. Pretrial Proceedings in Criminal Cases
A qualified right of access has been extended to pretrial proceedings in

79. Hon. KimbaM. Wood, Reexamining theAccess Doctrine,69 S. CALL. REv. 1105,1120

(1996).
80. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,577 (1980); People v. Ramos, 685
N.E.2d 492,498 n.3 (N.Y. 1997).
81. The Sixth Amendment requirement ofa"public trial is for the benefit of the accused; that
the public may see he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned, and that the presence of
interested spectators may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility and to the
importance of their functions." In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,270 n.25 (1948) (quoting THOMAS M.
COOLEY, CONSTrTUTONA.LIMITATIONS 647 (8th ed. 1927)).
82. See Williams v. State, 690 N.E.2d. 162, 166 (Ind. 1997).
83. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 525 (1984).
84. See People v. Woodward, 841 P.2d 954,956-57 (Cal. 1992).

85. See United States v. Antar, 839 F. Supp. 293, 302 (D.N.J. 1993).
86. While there is generally a right of public access to a trial, the public can properly be
excluded from conferences between the court and counsel even during a trial. See Miami Herald
Publ'g Co. v. Krentzman, 435 U.S. 968 (1978); United States v. Valenti, 987 F.2d 708,713 (11th
Cir. 1993); United States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202, 1210 (5th Cir. 1977); B.H. v. Ryder, 856 F.
Supp. 1285, 1290 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
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criminal cases that historically have been, and logically should be, open to
the public, except where closure is essential to serve a higher interest and
where closure is narrowly tailored. 7 Pretrial proceedings to which a right
of access attaches include preliminary hearings," plea proceedings, change
of venue hearings,89 competency hearings,' pretrial suppression hearings 9
and certain post-trial proceedings in criminal cases.'
3. Civil Trials
While the United States Supreme Court has not directly considered
whether the public and the press have a First Amendment right to attend
trials of civil cases, lower federal and state courts have held that such a
right exists.93
4. Other Proceedings
Proceedings without a tradition of access includejuvenile court,9 grand
jury,9' civil commitment, 6 deposition,97 search warrant,9" and settlement

87. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 478 U.S. 1, 6-10 (1986).
88. See El Vocero v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147, 150 (1993); Press-Enterprise,478 U.S. at
7.
89. See In Re The Charlotte Observer, 882 F.2d 850, 855 (4th Cir. 1989); L.A. Times v.
County of Los Angeles, 956 F. Supp. 1530, 1539 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
90. See In Re Times-World Corp., 488 S.E.2d 677, 683 (Va. Ct. App. 1997).
91. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39,48 (1984) (explaining that when defendant objects
to the closure of a pretrial suppression hearing, the hearing must be open unless the party seeking
to close the hearing advances an overriding interest which is likely to be prejudiced).
92. See United States v. Ellis, 90 F.3d 447,448 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Simone,
14 F.3d 833, 840 (3d Cir. 1994).
93. See Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co., 24 F.3d 893 (7th Cir. 1994)
(determining that media was entitled to intervene and challenge abuse of protective order); NBC
Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645 (Cal. CL App. 1996)
(reversing trial court order barring press from civil trial proceedings).
94. See United States v. A.D., 28 F.3d 1353,1358 (3d Cir. 1994) ("No centuries old tradition
of openness exists for juvenile proceedings, which are relatively recent creation, and proceedings
to determine whether a juvenile is a delinquent are not generally regarded as criminal
proceedings.'); Note, The Public RightofAccess of Juvenile DelinquencyHearings,81 MICH. L.
REv.1540, 1547-49 (1983). At this writing, the Supreme Court has not decided whether an acrossthe-board ban on access to juvenile proceedings would contravene the First Amendment.
95. See In Re Motions of Dow Jones & Co., 142 F.3d 496, 499 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
Constitutional powers such as Congress' impeachment power may authorize overriding grand jury
secrecy requirements. This was obviously the House of Representatives' conclusion when it voted
to release a videotape of President Clinton's grand jury testimony in the Monica Lewinsky
investigation.
96. See In Re Belk, 420 S.E.2d 682, 685 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992).
97. See Palm Beach County Newspapers, Inc. v. Burk, 504 So. 2d 378, 383 (Fla.1987).
98. See United States v. Certain Real Property, 977 F. Supp. 833, 836 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
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proceedings. 99
D. Place of Trial
While the place of trial is subject to judicial control, holding a criminal
trial or part thereof at a location other than the common place or time may
give rise to questions of whether the public trial rights of the defendant or
the public have been violated. It has been held, however, that conducting
part of a criminal trial in prison,"° or the individual voir dire of jurors in
the anteroom" did not constitute a denial of a party's right to have a
public trial where it was determined that the public could have gained
access if it so desired.
E. CourtDocuments
The United States Supreme Court has recognized a common law right
to inspect and copy judicial records and documents. 1" Under this doctrine,
"judicial documents are presumptively available to the public, but may be
sealed [or pseudonyms used] if the right to access is outweighed by the
interests favoring nondisclosure."1 3

99. "Settlement proceedings are historically closed procedures" to which there is no First
Amendment right of access. In Re Cincinnati Enquirer, 94 F.3d 198, 199 (6th Cir. 1996). See also
B.H. v. Ryder, 856 F. Supp. 1285, 1291 (N.D. Ill. 1994). Such settlement techniques as summary
jury trials have been closed to the press and public. See Cincinnati Gas &Ele. Co. v. General Elec.
Co., 854 F.2d 900, 905 (6th Cir. 1988). In a summary jury trial proceeding attorneys present
arguments to mock jurors who render an informal verdict that guides settlement of the case. See id.
at 901-02.
100. See William J. Appel, Exclusion of PublicfromState CriminalTrialby ConductingTrial
or PartThereofat Other Than RegularPlace or Time, 70 A.L.R. 4th 632 (1990).

101. See Commonwealth v. Harris, 703 A.2d 441,445-46 (Pa. 1997).
102. SeeNixon v. WamerCommunications Corp., 435 U.S. 589,597 (1978). Courtdocuments
have been defined to include
documents, exhibits in the custody of the clerk, papers, letters, maps, books, tapes,
photographs, films, recordings, data processing software or other material created
by any entity within thejudicial branch, regardless of physical form, characteristic,
or means of transmission, that are made or received pursuant to court rule, law or
ordinance, or in connection with the transaction of official business by any court
or court agency.
(b).
At this writing, the United States Supreme Court has not answered the question whether there
is a First Amendment right of access to documents in a criminal case or whether a First Amendment
balancing test must be applied before court records and documents can be sealed.
103. United States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 811 (10th Cir. 1997); see Doe v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield, 112 F.3d 869,872 (7th Cir. 1997); Peoplev. Burton, 597 N.Y.S.2d 488,491 (App.
Div. 1993); see also FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.051 (setting forth interests favoring confidentiality).
FLA.R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.051
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Court documents to which access is presumed include indictments,
motion documents, closed criminal case files, trial exhibits, recusal motion
documents, plea hearing documents, plea agreements, bail hearing
documents, affidavits of already-executed search warrants, jury lists, juror
questionnaires, appellate briefs, and all documents in a civil suit. 10' On the
other hand, access has been denied to on-line computer data," 5 unfiled
10 8
discovery depositions," 6 videotapes," search warrant affidavits,
documents maintained by a pretrial services agency,1" settlement
11 The presumption
documents, 10 and records made confidential by statute."
of access is "stronger" with regard to documents filed with the court,
"stronger yet" with regard to documents "upon which the court relies in
making a dispositive ruling,"
and "strongest" with regard to documents
112
offered in evidence at trial.
III. CLOSURE OF COURT PROCEEDINGS
Even where a qualified right of public access attaches, complete or
partial exclusion of the public may be justified if a court finds "that closure
is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest. The interest is to be articulated along with findings specific
enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was

104. See Washington Post v. Robinson, 935 F.2d 282,288 (D.C. Cir. 1991); In re New York
Times, 828 F.2d 110, 113-16 (2nd Cir. 1987)); L.A. Times v. County of Los Angeles, 956 F. Supp.
1530, 1539 (C.D. Cal. 1996). For a discussion as to the extent which the First amendment right of
access applies to civil court files and records, see Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059,
1067-68 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Continental Ill. Secs. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308-09 (7th Cir. 1984);
NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645,648-56 (Ct. App. 1996)
(reversing trial court order barring press from civil trial proceedings).
105. See LA. Times, 956 F. Supp. at 1540.
106. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20,33 (1984); Palm Beach Newspapers,
Inc. v. Burk, 504 So. 2d 378, 381-82 (Fla. 1987); State v. Lowe, 673 N.E.2d 1360, 1363 (Ohio
1997); Hutchison v. Luddy, 581 A.2d 578, 583 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
107. In United States v. McDougal,the press was denied access to the videotape recording of
President Clinton's deposition testimony in a criminal case because members of the public,
including the press, had been permitted to listen to the videotapes as they were played to the jury
in the courtroom and furnished with copies of the written transcript. See 103 F.3 d 651,658 (8th Cir.
1996).
108. See In re Four Search Warrants, 945 F. Supp. 1563, 1568 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
109. See Copley Press, Inc. v. Administrative Office of the Courts, 648 N.E.2d 324,328 (Ill.
1995).
110. See Minneapolis Star &Tribune Co. v. Schumacher, 392 N.W.2d 197,204 (Minn. 1986).
111. See T.T. v. State, 689 So. 2d 1209, 1210 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (discussing FLA. STAT. §
39.045(4) (1996), which addresses access to court records ofjuveniles); see also UNURRM TRADE
SECRETS ACT § 5 (U.L.A.).
112. In re Adobe Systems, Inc. Secs. Litig., 141 F.R.D. 155 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
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properly entered."113 However, "transcripts of properly closed proceedings
must be' 14required to be released when the danger of prejudice has
passed."
A. Criteriafor the Denial ofAccess
The right of public access to judicial proceedings" 5 or documents 116 is
qualified and may be overcome when the proponent of closure
demonstrates, and the court finds, that the denial of access is necessitated
by an overriding governmental interest and that closure is narrowly tailored
to serve that interest. Interests justifying closure may include the right to
a fair trial," 7 protecting the physical and psychological well-being of
juvenile victims of sex crimes,"' assuring the safety and effectiveness of
police informants," 9 furthering the privacy interests of third parties, 120 and
preventing in-court media coverage from creating a "carnival atmosphere"

113. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984) (quoting Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior
Court of Cal. 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)); see also Williams v. State, 690 N.E.2d 162, 167 (Ind.
1997). However, courts are encouraged to seek the voluntary cooperation of the news media before
invoking closure. See State v. MontanaTwenty-FirstJudicial Dist. Court, 933 P.2d 829,834 (Mont.
1997).
114. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368,393 (1979); see also United States v. Valenti,
987 F.2d 708, 714 (1 th Cir. 1993) (citing GannettCo., 443 U.S. at 393).
115. See State v. Bone-Club, 906 P.2d 325, 328 (Wash. 1995). In deciding whether to close
a proceeding, the same factors should be considered whether a closure motion is made by the
defendant over the First Amendment objection of the government or press. See United States v.
Doe, 63 F.3d 121, 127-28 (2nd Cir. 1995).
116. See United States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806,811 (10th Cir. 1997).
117. See Welsh Television, Inc. v. Freeman, 691 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). Closure to
protect the accused's right to a fair trial is appropriate only if specific findings are made
demonstrating that, first, there is a substantial probability that the defendant's right to a fair trial
will be prejudiced by publicity that closure would prevent and, second, reasonable alternatives to
closure cannot adequately protect the defendant's fair trial rights. See Bigelow v. Commissioner,
65 F.3d 127 (9th Cir. 1995).
118. See GlobeNewspaper, Inc. v. SuperiorCourt, 457 U.S. 596,607-08 (1982); United States
v. Osborne, 68 F.3d 94,99 (5th Cir. 1995); State v. Fageroos, 531 N.W.2d 199,202 (Minn. 1995);
Austin Daily Herald v. Mork, 507 N.W.2d 854,858 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
119. See Okonkwo v. Lacy, 104 F.3d 21,25 (2d Cir. 1997); Pearson v. James, 105 F.3d 828,
831 (2d Cir. 1997); State v. Bone-Club, 906 P.2d 325, 328 (Wash. 1995); Ex Parte Birmingham
News Co., 624 So. 2d 1117, 1134 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993); Robin Zeidel, Note, Closing the
Courtroomfor UndercoverPoliceWitnesses: New YorkMustAdopt a Consistent Standard,4 J.L.
& POL'Y 659-717 (1996).
120. See United States v. Doe, 63 F.3d 121, 128 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Hailer, 837
F.2d 84,87 (2d Cir. 1988); In re New York Times Co., 828 F.2d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 1987); Wendt
v. Wendt, 706 A.2d 1021, 1025 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1996). On the other hand, most courts expressly
exclude reputation and embarrassment as a permissible basis for closure or to justify the use of
pseudonyms. See, e.g., Reznik v. Hofeld, 618 S.E.2d 160 (IIl. 1996).
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in the courtroom. 12' On the other hand, preventing injury to personal or
corporate reputation, 22 or lessening the anxiety of a defendant, 123 have
been held not to constitute overriding interests justifying closure.
B. Closure Procedures
Before ordering a closure of court proceedings, the United States
Supreme Court requires that the trial court find not only that closure is
essential to preserve an overriding governmental interest, 24 but also that
there is a "substantial probability" that the interest sought to be protected
will be prejudiced by the open courtroom and that closure would prevent
the prejudicial effect." s The court must narrowly tailor its closure order to
serve the interest sought to be protected, 126 consider reasonable alternatives
to closure, and then conclude that such alternatives would not adequately
protect the defendant's right to a fair trial. 27 These determinations should
be supported by specific, individualized findings articulated on the record
before closure is effected. The court must make such findings regardless
of whether closure is sought by the government over the defendant's Sixth
Amendment objection or by the defendant over the First Amendment
objection of the government or press. Ordinarily, a motion to close a trial
to the public should be made before trial to avoid unfair surprise and to

121. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1996).
122. See State v. Cottman Transmission Sys. Inc., 542 A.2d 859, 864 (Md. 1988). Injury to
corporate or personal reputation is an inherent risk in almost every civil trial.
123. See Ex Parte The Island Packet, 417 S.E.2d 575, 578 (S.C. 1992) ("[L]essening a
defendant's anxiety, even a juvenile's, does not promote a higher value than protection of the
public's constitutional right of access."). "A reasonable alternative to closure can be in camera
testimony regarding matters of a confidential nature." Id.
124. "A court ordering closure must first establish that the competing interest asserted is not
only 'compelling,' but also that it outweighs the First Amendment right of access." United States
v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1359 (3d Cir. 1994).
125. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 478 U.S. 1, 13 (1986) ("If the interest
asserted is the right of the accused to a fair trial, [a proceeding to which the right of access applies]
shall be closed only if specific findings are made demonstratihg that, first, there is a substantial
probability that the defendant's right to a fair trial will be prejudiced by publicity that closure would
prevent and, second, reasonable alternatives to closure cannot adequately protect the defendant's
fair trial rights.").
126. The trial court, upon ruling that a closure is warranted, must extend its order no further
than the circumstances warrant. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Lewis, 426 So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla.
1982).
127. See id. Alternatives that may be considered include continuance, peremptory challenges,
sequestration, admonition of the jury or severance. Although courts list a change of venue as an
alternative measure, the Sixth Amendment right of the accused to trial by "an impartial jury of the
state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed," U.S. CONST. amend. VI, may
override the efficacy of this option, at least over the defendant's objection. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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give the trial court time to do research and hear arguments.1
C. PartialClosure
A partial closure of court proceedings is one that generally "results in
the exclusion of certain members of the public while other members of the
public are permitted to remain in the courtroom."'129 Where a partial rather
than a total closure is involved, a "substantial reason" is sufficient to
justify the closure. 30 The exclusion of certain members of the public from
the courtroom in order to maintain proper decorum,' 3 ' prevent
overcrowding,32 avoid the intimidation of witnesses 3 3 or preserve trade
secrets,"M exemplify justifications for partial closures of court proceedings.

128. See State v. Garcia, 561 N.W.2d 599,605 (N.D. 1997). As recommended guidelines for
a judge making a closure determination, (1)notice must be given to at least one representative of
the local news media when a motion for closure is filed and when it is heard by the court, and (2)
those seeking closure have the burden of producing evidence and proving that closure is necessary.
See Miami HeraldPubl'gCo., 426 So. 2d at 7.
129. Garcia,561 N.W.2d at 605.
130. Press-EnterpriseCo., 464 U.S. at 510; see also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
448 U.S. 555,581 (1980) (plurality opinion); Guzman v. Scully, 80 F.3d 772,775 (2d Cir. 1996);
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1982) (requiring a "compelling"
interest); People v. Chan, 656 N.Y.S.2d 22 (App. Div. 1997) (holding that the exclusion of certain
individuals from courtroom was constitutional); State v. Garcia, 561 N.W.2d at 606 (N.D. 1997)
(holding partial closure of trial is constitutional).
131. See United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830,860 (1lth Cir. 1985); Thomas M. Fleming,
Exclusion of Publicfrom State Criminal Trialin Orderto PreventDisturbanceby Spectatorsor
Defendant, 55 A.L.R. 4th 1170 (1988).
132. See Commonwealth v. Stilley, 689 A.2d 242,253 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
133. See Consentino v. Kelly, 102 F.3d 71,73 (2d Cir. 1996); Guzman, 80 F.3d at774; Woods
v. Kuhlmann, 977 F.2d 74,76 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1356-59
(9th Cir. 1989); Nieto v. Sullivan, 879 F.2d 743, 753 (10th Cir. 1989) (excluding the defendant's
relatives only during the victim's testimony was justified in order to protect the victim who was
afraid of testifying); Fleming, supra note 131.
134. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 600 (plurality opinion) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) ("The preservation of trade secrets... might justify the exclusion of the public from
at least some segments of a civil trial."); Standard & Poor's Corp. v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 541
F. Supp. 1273,1277-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (discussing how acourtroom was closed duringtestimony
concerning alleged trade secrets). An exception to the public's right to access when a case involves
trade secrets is widely recognized. See, e.g., Valley Broad. v. United States District Court, 798 F.2d
1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1986); In re Iowa Freedom of Info. Council, 724 F.2d 658, 662 (8th Cir.
1983); Brown &Williamson Tobacco Co. v. Federal Trade Conm'n, 710F.2d 1165,1180 (6th Cir.
1983). Closing the courtroom during testimony concerning confidential data supporting scientific
research which is deemed to be relevant to issues in litigation may alleviate some of the problems
arising from court ordered disclosure of academic research. See generallyJoe S. Cecil & Gerald T.
Wetherington, Court-OrderedDisclosureofAcademic Research:A Clashof Values ofScience and
Law, LAW AND CoNTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1996, at 3.
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D. Time, Place,andMannerRestrictions
A trial judge may impose reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions on access to court proceedings.135 For example, admittance into
a courtroom can be conditioned on spectators providing identification,136
surrendering firearms, 37 submitting to security screening,"' or entering
only during certain hours.' 39 Limitations on ingress and egress by locking
the courtroom doors or posting "Do Not Enter" signs have been upheld in
order to maintain security, avoid interruptions, ensure a nondisruptive
atmosphere, 14° or prevent overcrowding. 4 ' Delaying the dissemination of
4
court
1 or media's
conditioning
the media's
public
information,1
proceeding
upon the
agreement
not attendance
to publishat acertain

135. See Richmond NewspapersInc., 448 U.S. at 581 n.18.
Just as a government may impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions
upon the use of its streets in the interest of such objectives as the free flow of
traffic, so may a trial judge, in the interest of the fair administration of justice,
impose reasonable limitations on access to a trial. "iTihe question in a particular
case is whether that control is exerted so as not to deny or unwarrantedly abridge
... the opportunities for the communication of thought and the discussion of
public questions immemorially associated with resort to public places."
Id.; see also Bell v. Evatt, 72 F.3d 421,432-33 (4th Cir. 1995); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMIAL
JUSTICE 8-3-2(c) (2d ed. 1980).
136. See United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120, 1155-56 (11th Cir. 1997) (requiring all
persons entering courtroom to identify themselves by identification card, name, address, and birth
date); Williams v. State, 690 N.E.2d 162, 168-69 (Ind. 1997).
137. See People v. Swihart, 897 P.2d 822, 825-26 (Colo. 1995).
138. See McMorris v. Alioto, 567 F.2d 897, 901 (9th Cir. 1978) (upholding inspection of
briefcases and parcels as condition to enter a courthouse); Commonwealth v. Harris, 421 N.E.2d
447, 448 (Mass. 1981) (stating that packages, briefcases, or other items carried by a person must
be offered for an inspection); Bozer v. Higgins, 613 N.Y.S.2d 312, 313 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992)
("[L]imited courthouse searches to screen for weapons are reasonable under the Federal and State
Constitutions."); RhodeIsland Defense Attorneys Ass'n v. Dodd, 463 A.2d 1370,1372 (R.I. 1983)
(approving inspection of parcels, objects, or briefcases brought into courthouse).
139. See Ridenour v. Schwartz, 875 P.2d 1306, 1309 (Ariz. 1994) (holding that trial court's
general administrative order denying access to courthouse to any person not within the building by
3 p.m. did not violate the Arizona Constitution).
140. See Herring v. Meachum, 11 F.3d 374, 379-80 (2nd Cir. 1993); People v. Woodward,
841 P.2d 954,956-60 (Cal. 1992); United States v. Bails, 413 N.W.2d 709,710 (Mich. Ct. App.
1987).
141. See Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39,43 (2d Cir. 1996); Bell v. Evatt, 72 F.3d 421,433
(4th Cir. 1995); People v. Hughes, 657 N.Y.S.2d 695 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); In re Times-World
Corp., 373 S.E.2d 474,478-81 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
142. See, e.g., Sacramento Bee v. United States Dist. Court, 656 F.2d 477, 482 (8th Cir. 1981);
Advisory Committee Note, 91 F.R.D. 289, 373 (discussing delays in dissemination of potentially
prejudicial information).
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information,143 or not to photograph the faces of sitting or prospective
jurors," may also be justified under certain circumstances.
IV. SEIrLEMBNT OF A HIGH PROFILE CASE:

THE NEED FOR CoNFiDENmiury

During the pretrial stage of a high profile case and, in some instances,
even during the trial, the parties may attempt to settle their disputes. Courts
generally have a strong interest in promoting settlement of cases. 45
Settlement saves judicial time and resources" and permits the parties to
reduce expenses, eliminate the risks of trial, and resolve the case after
consideration of possible solutions that may or may not be available
through court remedies.'47
This strong judicial interest in promoting the settlement of cases is
especially critical in high profile cases. A settlement agreement in a high
profile civil case or a negotiated plea agreement in a high profile criminal
case can serve the interests ofjustice by leading to resolutions that are both
acceptable to the parties and public's sense of justice. This can be vastly
important, particularly in cases posing a threat of civil disturbance.
Conversely, an unpopular settlement of a high profile case can severely
damage public confidence in the judicial system with consequent
repercussions. Thus, the court should exercise great forethought before
encouraging settlement efforts.
One of the greatest difficulties presented to the court and the parties in
attempting to settle a high profile case is that such a case pits the need for
confidentiality, which is generally believed to be essential to the settlement
process, against the voracious desire of the media and the public to know
every development in the case. Aggressive media activity can produce
breaches in confidentiality which can impede and perhaps defeat settlement

143. See Tsokalas v. Purtill, 756 F. Supp. 89,90 (D.Conn. 1981); Mayer v. State, 523 So. 2d
1171, 1172-73 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); In re A Minor, 563 N.E.2d 1069, 1071 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990);
Austin Daily Herald v. Mork, 507 N.W.2d 854, 856 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); In re VV Pub. Corp.,
577 A.2d 412,414 (N.J. 1990).
144. See State ex rel National Broad. Co. v. Court of Common Pleas, 556 N.E.2d 1120, 1123
(Ohio 1990). Such an order was entered by Miami-Dade County, Florida Circuit Court Judge
Robert Kaye in the case of Broin v. Phillip Morris Cos., Case No. 91-49738 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1991).
145. Expanding caseloads having significantly increased the need for settlement in judicial
systems. For example, civil filings in federal courts increased from 51,063 in 1960 to almost
240,000 in 1988. See FEDERALCOURTS STUDY COMM'N, WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMrrr
REPORTS 30 (1990). This expansion in case filings has resulted in an increased pressure for judicial
involvement in settlement and alternative dispute resolution. See Lauren K. Robel, Private Justice
and the Federal Bench, 68 IND. L.J. 891, 893 (1993).
146. See Dale E. Rude & James A. Wall, Jr., Judicial Involvement in Settlement: How Judges
and Lawyers View It, 72 JUDICATURE 175, 175-79 (1988).
147. See id.
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attempts. Moreover, pervasive media coverage can generate public
resentment towards confidential attempts to resolve a high profile case.
These and other concerns may prompt a trial judge handling a high
profile case to avoid direct participation in confidential settlement
negotiations outside the presence of the public and the media,14 which
often occurs in non-high profile cases. If the trial judge elects not to
participate in settlement discussions, but wishes to promote settlement, the
trial judge may decide to appoint a mediator or other alternative dispute
resolution professional to direct settlement discussions. 49
The importance of promoting settlement in a high profile case with the
attendant difficulties stated above requires the trial judge to undertake
settlement efforts with caution. The court's authority concerning settlement
negotiations and the principles of confidentiality that apply to such
negotiations should be carefully ascertained before the settlement process
begins. Moreover, the court should think about how to deal with the
situation if confidentiality is breached or other problems arise in the
settlement process. The court should give the same thought, care, and
attention to the settlement process as to the trial of the case itself.
V. TELEVISED COVERAGE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
While televised coverage ofjudicial proceedings does not per se violate
a defendant's due process rights, the United States Supreme Court has not
yet recognized any First Amendment right of the media to televise court
proceedings. 150 Many states now permit electronic coverage of court
proceedings.' In those states, various rules and guidelines govern such
coverage. Such guidelines generally include provisions with regard to
media equipment, lights, number of media personnel, types of cameras,
position of equipment operators, and movement in the courtroom. 152

148. Settlement proceedings are historically closed procedures to which there is no First
Amendment right of access. See In Re Cincinnati Enquirer, 94 F.3d 198, 199 (6th Cir. 1996);
Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900,903 (6th Cir. 1988); Ritti v. Ryder,
854 F. Supp. 1285 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
149. See PETER SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL MASS TOXIC TORT DISASTERS IN THE
COURTs 143-67 (1987) (discussing use of settlement masters).
150. See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 574, 582-83 (1981); Matin Indep. Journal v.
Municipal Court, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550,551 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
151. See Christo Lassiter, TV or Not TV-That It is the Question, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 928, 928 (1996); Christo Lassiter, An Annotated Descriptive Summary of State
Statutes,Judicial Codes, Canons,and Court Rules relating to Admissibility and Governanceof
Camerasin the Courtroom, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMOLOGY 1019 (1996). A nationwide three-year
experimental program allowing television coverage in some federal trial and appeals courts was
voted down by the Judicial Conference of the United States on December 31, 1994. See id.
152. See, e.g., Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.170 (Standards of Conduct and Technology Governing
Electronic Media and Still Photography Coverage of Judicial Proceedings).
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Consent of the presiding judge is often required and the judge has
discretion to control the coverage during the proceedings, such as by
prohibiting
visual identification of jurors, victims, or witnesses who
153
object.

Electronic or other recording of judicial proceedings is subject to
judicial control. 54 Judges deciding whether to permit proceedings to be
televised should consider such factors as the identity of the parties and
witnesses, the nature and subject matter of the proceeding, and the impact
of television coverage. Potential impacts include prejudice to the public's
trust in the juridical system, as well as possible adverse effects on the
parties' right to a fair trial, the ability to impanel an impartial jury, and the

trial participants' right to privacy and confidentiality.'55

Due in part to backlash to the O.J. Simpson criminal trial, judges across
the country have prohibited the televising of a number of high-profile
cases.'56 These cases include the second prosecution of the Menendez
brothers in California, 5 7 the trial of Susan Smith for the murder of her two
sons in South Carolina, 158 the death penalty case in California of Richard
Allen Davis accused of killing 12-year-old Polly Klass,'59 and the trial of
Yolanda Saldivar for the murder of the singer Selena in Texas.' 60Superior
Judge Hiroshi Fujisaki, repeatedly citing the media coverage in the
criminal trial, banned televised coverage of O.J. Simpson's civil trial under
California Court Rule 980.161

153. See, e.g., Times Publ'g Co. v. State, 632 So. 2d 1072, 1073-76 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
154. See State v. Green, 395 So. 2d 532, 536 (Fla. 1981).
155. See 66 U.S.L.W. 2479 (citing Civil Practice Standards adopted by the A.B.A. House of
Delegates at its mid-year meeting in February of 1998).
156. See, e.g., Mark Hamblett &Nell Porter Brown, Justice Upholds TV Ban at Salvi Trial:
"Special Circumstances" (citing PATRIOr LEDGER, Feb. 2, 1996, at 5).
157. See Ann W. O'Neill & J. Michael Kennedy, Judge Bars Television Cameras from
CourtroomforMenendez Retrial; Ruling: Although Simpson CaseIs Not Mentioned, DecisionIs
Seen as Backlash to Controversy OverMedia CoverageIt Received, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1995, at
B1.
158. See Cameras,ElectronicMedia Bannedat Susan Smith Trial,L.A. TMES, July 2, 1995,
at A16.
159. See Jamie Beckett, CamerasBarredat Klass Trial,S.F. CHRON., Feb. 6, 1996, at Al.
160. See Judge Rejects Requestsfor Live TV Coverageof Trial in Selena'sSlaying, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Sept. 7, 1995, at 25A.
161. California Rule of Court 980 permits film or electronic media coverage by court order,
although the court may "refuse or terminate [such coverage] in the interests ofjustice to protect the
rights of the parties and the dignity of the court, or to assure the orderly conduct of proceedings."
Kelli L. Sager & Karen N. Frederiksen, Televising the JudicialBranch: In Furtheranceof the
Public'sFirstAmendmentRights, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1519 (1996); see also Abraham Abramovsky
& Jonathan I. Edelstein, Cameras in the Jury Room: An Unnecessary and DangerousPrecedent,
28 ARI7. ST. L.J. 865, 865-892 (1996); S.L. Alexander, The Impact of California v. Simpson on
Cameras in the Courtroom,79 JUDICATURE 169, 169-75 (1996).
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VI. METHODS TO CONTROL PREJUDICIAL

PRETRIAL PuBLIrY

Massive publicity of inadmissible facts about a party or issues involved
in a high profile case can prejudice a party's right to a fair trial. 6
Publicizing illegally seized evidence or an illegally obtained confession,
for example, can potentially devastate a defendant's right to a fair trial in
a criminal case. The court has a duty to provide all parties their right to a
fair trial and, consequently, to prevent prejudicial publicity from interfering

with this right.
There are several methods available to the court to discharge this duty.
The most extreme method under First Amendment law is the imposition
by the court of apriorrestraint prohibiting the dissemination ofprejudicial
information. Prior restraints are seldom justified under the constitutional
standards governing their exercise. In limited circumstances, however, a
prior restraint may be both necessary and permissible.
Additionally, the court may, in some circumstances, order closure of a
pretrial proceeding to insure that dissemination of prejudicial information
throughout the community will not jeopardize the fairness of the trial.
Moreover, where statements ofparticipants or lawyers involved in the case
threaten the right to a fair trial, the court may prevent such statements by
issuing a restraining order. Even without a restraining order, however, the
attorneys and judge involved in the case are usually prohibited from
making prejudicial statements about the case by applicable ethics codes.163
Each of the above methods of controlling prejudicial publicity is
governed by its own standards and criteria and has its own advantages and
disadvantages. The court should consider and evaluate all available
methods of controlling prejudicial publicity in a high profile case."

162. TheUnited States Supreme Courthas longrecognized that adverse publicitycan endanger
the ability of a defendant to receive a fair trial. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966)
(discussing the prejudicial effect of pretrial publicity). In Sheppard, the Court reversed the
conviction of Dr. Sam Sheppard for the murder of his wife Marilyn because the trial judge failed
to fulfill his duty to protect Sheppard from the inherently prejudicial publicity which saturated the
community and failed to control disruptive influences in the courtroom. See id.at 362-63. Although
Sheppard was acquitted on retrial, he remained convicted in the public's mind until DNA studies
of hair samples confirmed that another man had in fact murdered Marilyn Sheppard (just as
Sheppard had always maintained) proving he was innocent after all. Cf., e.g., Sam Sheppard:The
Real Story (The Learning Channel television broadcast, Sept. 7,1997). But for the Warren Court's
decision, we probably would never have known.
163. See, e.g., FLA. R. PROFESSiONAL CONDuCT 4-3.6 (1997); FLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT, Canon 5A (1997).
164. Restrictions on the freedom of speech are subject to different tests depending upon
whether the restriction is content based or content neutral. Content based restrictions are subject
to "strict scrutiny" while content neutral restrictions are subject to a balancing analysis. See United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,382-86 (1968); State v. Conforti, 688 So. 2d 350,354-55 (Fla. 4th

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1999

29

Florida Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 3 [1999], Art. 2
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

A. PriorRestraints on the Media
"The term 'prior restraint' is used 'to describe administrative orjudicial
orders forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the
time that such communications are to occur."' 165 The constitutional
guarantee of "freedom of the press"' 66 embodies special protection for the
media from prior restraints on publication. 67 Prior restraints on publication
consist of court imposed restrictions that are directed at the media, and that
intrude upon the media's editorial process by68 interfering with its right to
publish material which it already possesses.
Because prior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious,
and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights, any prior
restraint bears a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.' 69 A
party seeking to obtain an order of prior restraint carries a heavy burden
of showing justification for the imposition of such an order. Whether an
order of prior restraint violates the First Amendment guarantee of freedom
of the press is determined principally by reference to the United States
Supreme Court's decision in NebraskaPressAss'n v. Stuart. 70 In that case
the Court confronted the difficult task of determining the proper balance
between a defendant's right to a fair trial and the media's First Amendment
free press right in the context of a sensational murder case that generated

DCA 1997).
165. Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993). It is not always clear what
government actions constitute a "prior restraint." See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior
Restraint,92 YALEL.J.409,419 (1983). Some prior restraints involve permits or licenses and some
involve injunctions (for example, "gag orders"). See id. Some involve neither permits nor
injunctions but are treated as prior restraints; others, meanwhile, are not so treated. See id.; see also
State v. Globe Communications Corp., 622 So. 2d 1066, 1072-75 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (discussing
restraints on media coverage of cases).
166. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The purpose of the First Amendment provision which guarantees
a free press is "to afford special protection against orders that prohibit the publication or broadcast
of particular information or commentary-orders that impose a 'previous' or 'prior' restraint on
speech." Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 556 (1976).
167. Examples of prior restraints on the media are found in Nebraska PressAss'n, 427 U.S.
at 542-46, a case involving judicial orders prohibiting the news media from disseminating
confessions or admissions made by an accused in a murder case, and in New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971), a case in which the United States sought to enjoin the
New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing the contents of a classified historical
study on Vietnam policy.
168. See State v. Montana Judicial District Court, 933 P.2d 829, 840-41 (Mont. 1997).
169. See Nebraska PressAss'n,427 U.S. at 556-570. A court may impose a prior restraint on
the media for the purpose of protecting the integrity of court proceedings only if "the gravity of the
'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid
the danger." Id. at 561 (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201,212 (2d Cir. 1950)).
170. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
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extensive pretrial publicity.
The Court set forth the following factors in Nebraska PressAss'n to
govern the constitutionality of a court order imposing a prior restraint on
the media to protect a party's right to a fair trial.
[W]e must examine the evidence before the trial judge when
the order was entered to determine (a) the nature and extent
of pretrial news coverage; (b) whether other measures would
be likely to mitigate the effects of unrestrained pretrial
publicity; and (c) how effectively a restraining order would
operate to prevent the threatened danger. The precise terms of
the restraining order are also important. We must then
consider whether the record supports the entry of a prior
restraint on publication, one of the172 most extraordinary
remedies known to our jurisprudence.
Justice Blackmun summarized the state of prior restraint doctrine as
follows:
Although the prohibition against prior restraints is by no
means absolute, the gagging of publication has been
considered acceptable only in "exceptional cases." Even
where questions of allegedly urgent national security, or
competing constitutional interests, are concerned, we have
imposed this "most extraordinary remedy" only where the evil
that would result from the reportage is both great and certain
and cannot be militated by less intrusive measures.' 73
In almost all reported cases, court-imposed prior restraints on the
publication of information already in the media's possession have been
declared invalid. For example, courts applying the NebraskaPressAss'n
analysis have held that the following violated the test for a constitutional
prior restraint: an injunction prohibiting Business Week magazine from
publishing an article disclosing the contents of documents placed under the
seal of secrecy by the parties to a lawsuit; 74 a court order prohibiting the
broadcast of a segment of Fox Network's America 'sMost Wantedprogram

171. Seeid.at541.
172. Id. at 562. In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart
and Marshall, advocated an absolute ban on prior restraints on publication of information related
to a criminal trial. See id. at 572 (Brennan, J., concurring).
173. CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315, 1317 (1994).
174. See Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 224-25 (6th Cir. 1996).
Nonetheless, protective orders may be imposed in connection with information acquired through
civil discovery. See United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593,602 (1995); Seattle Times v. Rhinehart,
467 U.S. 20, 31 (1984).
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on the ground that it lacked newsworthiness; 75 and an order prohibiting the
1 76
publication of certain information obtained by the press atjury selection.
Moreover, judicial decisions have invalidated prior restraints on the
publication of confidential information lawfully obtained by the media.1"
In only a very narrow class of "exceptional cases" have court-imposed
prior restraints been upheld as necessary and proper. Such cases might take
place when the nation is at war, and national security mandates a prior
restraint, or where a prior restraint is necessary to protect the right of a
litigant not to have their trial strategy and protected confidences disclosed
to the prosecution. 178 Also, the United States Supreme Court held that a
newspaper, which was itself a defendant in a libel action, could be
restrained from publishing material about the plaintiffs and their supporters
to which it had gained access through court-ordered discovery. 179 In that
case the Supreme Court said that "[a]lthough litigants do not 'surrender
their First Amendment rights at the courthouse door,' those rights may be
subordinated to other interests that arise in this setting." '
Other courts have temporarily enjoined the publication of information
to maintain the status quo pending a later determination of validity. 81 For
example, in United States v. Noriega,8 2 Judge William Hoeveler
temporarily enjoined CNN from broadcasting certain recorded telephone

175. See Clear Channel Communications v. Murray, 636 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
176. See Times Publ'g Co. v. State, 632 So. 2d 1072, 1074 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
177. See B.J.F. v. Florida Star, 491 U.S. 524,540-41 (1989); Smith v.Daily Mail Publ'g Co.,
443 U.S. 97, 104 (1979); Oklahoma Publ'g Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308, 311 (1977); Cox
Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495-97 (1975). At this writing, the Supreme Court has not
decided whether information unlawfully obtained by the press in violation of court rule or statute
can be restrained; however, some courts have so held. See, e.g., Main Indep. Journal v. Municipal
Court, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550, 553 (Ct. App. 1993).
178. See, e.g., New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 725 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1045, 1051-52 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
179. See Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 37.
180. I.at32n.18.
181. See Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Food & Drug Admin., 953 F. Supp. 400,
401 (D.D.C. 1996) (finding that a temporary protective order prohibiting citizens' group from
disseminating information that the government had inadvertently released did not run afoul of the
First Amendment); Tsokalas v. Purtill, 756 F. Supp. 89, 90 (D. Conn. 1991) (ordering confiscation
of a sketch artist's drawing to prevent its publication); Marin Indep. Journal, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
551; Main Indep. Journal v. Mun. Court, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550, 551 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); State v.
Alston, 887 P.2d 681,687 (Kan. 1994) (citing Unified School District No. 503 v. McKinney, 689
P.2d 860 (1984)) ("mhe purpose of such [an] order is to restrain a defendant for a very brief
period, pending a hearing on the application for a temporary injunction.'); KUTV, Inc. v.
Wilkinson, 686 P.2d 456,458 (Utah 1984). The restraining order can go no further than to preserve
the status quo until the hearing is held for the temporary injunction, the status quo being the last
actual, peaceable, noncontested position of the parties which preceded the pending controversy.").
182. See 752 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D. Fla.), aff'd, 917 F.2d 1543 (1 lth Cir. 1990), cert.deniedsub
nom. Cable News Network, Inc. v. Noriega, 498 U.S. 976 (1990).
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conversations between General Noriega and his defense counsel that were
allegedly taped by the government while Noriega was in prison and
obtained by CNN from an undisclosed source. s3 The injunction was to
remain in effect until CNN produced the tape recordings in its possession
so the District Court could review the contents of those recordings, and
determine if the NebraskaPress test justified a prior restraint in favor of
Noriega's right to a fair trial. 1 4 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld Judge Hoeveler's order and directed CNN to produce the tapes for
the court's review.185 After the Supreme Court denied CNN's application
for certiorari, the news network produced the tapes for the trial court's
review."8 6 After hearing the tapes, Judge Hoeveler determined that General
Noriega was not entitled to a prior restraint prohibiting the broadcasting of
the tapes by CNN since Noriega could not meet his burden under the first
prong of the NebraskaPresstest requiring the judge to consider the extent
and the prejudicial nature of the publication sought to be restrained.8 7
Judge Hoeveler concluded that the capture of a foreign ruler brought to
trial in the United States had created extensive negative publicity "well
beyond the Southern District of Florida." ' However, in reviewing the
tapes the judge stated that the conversations were insignificant or so
"cryptic and disjointed that.., the court could [not] construct an adequate
description of its nature or content," meaning the conversations, if
published, would not prejudice Noriega's right to a fair trial.8 9
Prior restraints on the media should be distinguished from other
restraints which affect the media's ability to obtain information but which
do not regulate the media's ability to publish information in its possession.
As noted in State v. Montana Judicial District Court,19° such other
restraints include:
(1)

Restraints which are aimed at the media's ability to
gather information or to access official proceedings but
which do not intrude upon the media's prerogative to
publish or edit information already in its possession.
Examples include orders which prohibit the press from
attending voir dire examinations or pretrial suppression
hearings. Such restrictions are not 'prior restraints' on

183. Noriega,752 F. Supp. at 1047.
184. See id. at 1049. The recorded tapes allegedly contained discussions of the defense's trial
strategy and the investigation of pending criminal charges against Noriega. See id. at 1047.
185. See United States v. Noriega, 917 F.2d 1543, 1552 (1lth Cir. 1990).
186. See id.
187. See Noriega, 752 F. Supp. at 1053.
188. Id.

189. Id
190. 933 P.2d 829 (Mont. 1997).
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publication....
Restraints which are not directed at the media but at
the sources of information; for example, participant
gag orders. Although such restrictions infringe upon
the media's ability to access news and thus the public's
right to know, they are not "prior restraints" upon the
media's right to edit or publish that which it knows.191
B. Closure of PretrialProceedings

In contrast to a prior restraint on publication, the closure of court
proceedings is an "indirect restraint" aimed at the media's ability to gather
information or to access official proceedings which does not intrude upon
the media's prerogative to publish or edit information already in its
possession. 92 Closure of pretrial proceedings193 can help a trial judge
ensure that dissemination of inadmissible prejudicial information before
94
the trial has begun will not jeopardize the fairness of the proceeding.'
In the context of a trial court's decision to close a preliminary hearing
to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial, the United States Supreme
Court requires specific factual findings that: 1) "there is a substantial
probability that the defendant's right to a fair trial will be prejudiced by the
publicity;"195 2) there is a substantial probability that closure would prevent
that prejudice; and 3) "reasonable alternatives to closure cannot adequately
protect the defendant's fair trial rights."' 96 Other factors examined include
the extent of prior hostile publicity, the probability that the issues involved

191. Id. at 842.
192. Id.at 838-39.

193. The Supreme Court has recognized a qualified right of access to certain pretrial
proceedings. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 478 U.S. 1, 13 (1986).
194. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 378 (1979) ('The danger of publicity
concerning pretrial suppression hearings is particularly acute, because it may be difficult to measure
with any degree of certainty the effects of such publicity on the fairness of the trial."); Estes v.
Texas, 381 U.S. 532,536 (1965) (pretrial publicity "can create a major problem for the defendant
in a criminal case" and "may be more harmful than publicity during the trial for it may well set the
community opinion as to guilt or innocence").
195. Press-Enterprise,478 U.S. at 14. The Court also stated that the purpose of requiring
specific findings is to demonstrate that "closure is essential to preserve higher values and is
narrowly tailored to serve that interest." Id. (quoting Press-Enterprise,464 U.S. at 510).
196. Id. Reasonable alternatives to closure include searching voir dire examination ofjurors,
clear and emphatic cautionary instructions, change of venue, continuance of the trial date,
sequestration of the jury, and postponement of the hearing of a pretrial motion. See Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333,363 (1966); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 27 Cal. Rptr.
2d. 708,712 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Kelly, 695 A.2d 1,14 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997); Rockdale
Citizen Publ'g Co. v. State, 463 S.E.2d 864, 866 n.1 (Ga. 1995); Baltimore Sun Co. v. Colbert, 593
A.2d 224, 229 (Md. 1991); State v. Bassett, 911 P.2d 385, 388 (Wash. 1996).
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at the pretrial hearing will further aggravate the adverse publicity, and
whether traditional judicial techniques to insulate the jury from the
consequences of such publicity will ameliorate the problem."9 Unless these
requirements are satisfied, the trial court should not grant a motion to close
the hearing.198
Courts have clearly identified jury voir dire as the preferred alternative
to closure. The court in the case of In re CharlotteObserver,1 9 stated that:
[R]ecent experience in a number of nationally publicized
trials of widely publicized individuals serves to validate the
efficacy of the voir dire for this purpose. Cases such as those
involving the Watergate defendants, the Abscam defendants,
and more recently, John DeLorean, all characterized by
massive pretrial media reportage and commentary,
nevertheless proceeded to trial withjuries which-remarkably
in the eyes of many-were satisfactorily disclosed to have
been unaffected (indeed, in some instances, blissfully
unaware of or untouched) by that publicity.2 °0
Conducting a closure hearing presents special problems to the court:
The proper conduct of the hearing of a motion to close carries
with it its own problems. Ordinarily, at the hearing the
moving party must inform the court of the precise nature of
sensitive information, which necessarily will be revealed at
the proceeding to be closed, and must convince the court that
the public disclosure of that information would interfere with
the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial. Patently, if the
sensitive information is publicly disclosed at the hearing of
the motion for closure, the very damage sought to be avoided
is done. Thus, the hearing of the motion must itself often be
closed to the public, at least in part. In making the
determination of how much, if any, of the closure motion
must be conducted privately, the trial judge must receive, on
the record but not publicly, proffers sufficient to allow the
judge to make an informed decision. That part of the record
may, of course, be sealed, but for no longer than is reasonably
required. 21

197. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368,378 (1979); accordSheppard v. Maxwell,
384 U.S. 333, 362-63 (1966); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Lewis, 426 So. 2d 1, 6 (Fla. 1982);
Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Morphonios, 467 So. 2d 1026, 1029 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).
198. See sources cited, supra note 197.
199. 882 F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 1989).
200. Id. at 855; see also In Re imes-World Corp., 488 S.E.2d 677,683 (Va. Ct. App. 1997).
201. BaltimoreSun Co., 593 A.2d at 230.
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C. ParticipantGag Orders
Prior restraints on publication should be distinguished from indirect
restraints on the media's ability to obtain information such as participant
gag orders. For purposes of this discussion, participant gag orders may be
defined as orders restraining trial participants from communicating with
the press.2 Such orders usually prohibit parties, witnesses,' their
attorneys, court staff, and members of law enforcement from disseminating
certain information about the case outside the courtroom.3
Gag orders have been issued in several high profile cases. 2°5 For
example, in the Oklahoma bombing trial of Timothy McVeigh, the court
entered a gag order restricting the extrajudicial statements of the lawyers
in the case.2 "6 Court staff was also prohibited from disclosing to any
persons, without court authorization, "any information relating to the
criminal case that is not part of the public record of the court."'7 Likewise,
in the O.J. Simpson civil trial the court entered the following standing
order:
No counsel, party or witnesses under the control of counsel
may discuss or state any opinions concerning evaluation of
evidence, including any witness whether called to testify or
202. See State v. Montana Judicial Dist. Court, 933 P.2d 829, 837 (Mont. 1997).
203. There is a surprising dearth of authority involving constitutional challenges to restrictive
orders directed to witnesses in criminal cases. See Pedini v. Bowles, 940 F. Supp. 1020,1022 (N.D.
Tex. 1996). For example, in In re Russell, the trial court entered an order prohibiting potential
witnesses in aracially-motivated murder case from making any extra-judicial statement "that relates
to, concerns, or discusses ... any of the parties or issues such potential witness expects or
reasonably should expect to be involved in this case." 726 F.2d 1007, 1008 (4th Cir. 1984). The
court's use of a reasonable likelihood standard of prejudice was upheld on appeal. See id.; cf.
Butterworth v. Smith,494 U.S. 624,636 (1990) (holdingunconstitutional a Florida lawprohibiting
a grand jury witness from disclosing their testimony after the term of the grand jury had ended).
204. The court should be reluctant to impose such restrictions on persons who are neither
attorneys nor participants in the case. See Stanfield v. Florida Dep't. of Child & Farn. Servs., 698
So. 2d 321, 323 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). In contrast, protective orders restraining the dissemination
of civil discovery materials have not been subjected to the same level of stringent First Amendment
scrutiny as applied to the dissemination of other materials. See United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S.
593, 606 (1995); Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 21 (1984); Farley v. Farley, 952 F.
Supp. 1232, 1245 (M.D. Tenn. 1997).
205. See Pedini, 940 F. Supp. at 1025; United States v. Davis, 904 F. Supp. 564,565 (E.D.
La. 1995); United States v. Hill, 893 F. Supp. 1039, 1042 (N.D. Fla. 1989); Sentinel
Communications Co. v. Watson, 615 So. 2d 768,770 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); Breiner v. Takao, 835
P.2d 637,640-42 (Haw. 1992); Erwin Chemerinsky, Lawyers Have Free Speech Rights Too: Why
Gag Orders on Trial ParticipantsAreAlmost Always Unconstitutional, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 31 1,
311 (1997).
206. See United States v. McVeigh, 931 F. Supp. 760,756 (D. Colo. 1997).
207. ld.
at 761.
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not, whether offered, received, excluded, purported to exist
but not tendered or not available, the jury or any juror, the
Court, including the trial proceedings, or whether the
defendant did or did not commit the homicides, outside of the
trial proceedings with the media or in public places within
hearing of the general public. This order extends to employees
and agents or representatives, whether paid or unpaid, of the
attorneys. This order does not apply to private discussions by
and among the attorneys in preparation of their case, with
their clients, staff, investigators and witnesses.... 208
In some cases gag orders are difficult to enforce" and may not stem the
flow of prejudicial information from the media.210 In such cases, the court
should consider attempting to get the parties to voluntarily limit
extrajudicial comments.21' When possible, the issuing court should
specifically delineate the topics forbidden by the gag order, and also
consider establishing a process to permit the restrained party to obtain a
court ruling determining whether a particular statement is prejudicial.
1. Status of Party Challenging Order
A participant gag order is subject to challenge by the parties, witnesses
in the case, the attorneys for the parties, and third parties, such as the
media. One of the major issues that has arisen regarding participant gag
orders is whether the standard to be applied in determining the
constitutionality
of a gag order is affected by the status of the party
212
challenging it.

208. Robert A. Pugsley, This CourtroomIsNota Television Studio: Why JudgeFujisakiMade
the CorrectCallin Gagging the Lawyers andthe Parties,andBanning the Camerasfromthe O.J.
Simpson Civil Case, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 369-381 (1997).
209. There is some reluctance on the part of judges and others to pursue sanctions for gag
order violations. For example, "federal prosecutors backed away from pursuing contempt charges
against a defendant in the Call Cartel trial and an out-spoken local attorney for critical remarks they
made about the government's case," even though a gag order barring comments from trial
participants was still in effect. Frank Davies, Judge in Cali Case Weights Gag Rule Violation,
MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 22, 1997, at B3. The judge in that case said he "was bothered by the trend
of 'trying cases on the courthouse steps' in front of TV cameras," but wasn't sure what could be
done about it. Id.
210. See generally Eileen A. Minnefor, Lookingfor FairTrialsin the InformationAge: The
Need for More Stringent Gag OrdersAgainst Trial Participants,30 U.S.F. L. REv. 95 (1995)
(arguing for greater use of gag orders).
211. See Order on Motion for Relief, issued May 5, 1997, in Broin v. Philip Morris Co., Case
No. 91-49738 (Fla. 11th Jud. Cir. Ct.).
212. See In re Application of Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d at 609 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating that
"there is a fundamental difference between agag order challenged by the individual gagged and one
challenged by a third party").
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2. Media Challenges to Participant Gag Orders
Although there is contrary authority, 13 most courts hold that the
NebraskaPressAss'n analysis does not apply when participant gag orders
are challenged by the media,214 and instead have upheld gag orders against
media challenges upon a showing of a reasonable likelihood that the
prohibited speech would prevent a fair trial.215 The United States Supreme
Court has denied a media petition for writ of certiorari to review a case
adopting the reasonable likelihood standard.216 Other courts have employed
the following heightened scrutiny analysis in the context of a participant
gag order challenged by the media.21 7
[A] gag order may issue only when the following conditions
have been met: (1) the press and general public must be given
an opportunity to be heard on the question before issuance of
the order; (2) the court describes what reasonable alternatives
have been considered and explains why those reasonable
alternatives cannot adequately protect the defendant's fair trial
rights; (3) the order is narrowly tailored to serve the interest
of protecting the defendant's fair trial rights; and (4) the court
has made specific findings that there is a substantial
probability that the defendant's right to a fair trial will be
prejudiced by publicity that the gag order would otherwise
prevent. This test grants more protection to the defendant than
allowed under traditional prior restraint analysis and at the
same time guarantees greater protection of the public's right
213. See Journal Publ'g Co. v. Meachem, 801 F.2d 1233, 1235 (10th Cir. 1986); CBS Inc. v.
Young, 522 F.2d 234, 238 (6th Cir. 1975). These courts deem gag orders as prior restraints
regardless of whether the order is challenged by the media or the party gagged. See JournalPubl'g
Co., 801 F.2d at 1235; CBS, Inc., 522 F.2d at 238.
214. See United States v. Hill, 893 F. Supp. 1039, 1041 (N.D. Fla. 1994).
215. See Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d at 604; Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 916
F. Supp. 575, 581 (M.D. La. 1996); United States v. Hill, 893 F. Supp. 1039, 1040-43 (N.D. Fla.
1994); South Bend Tribune, Inc. v. Elkhart Circuit Court, 691 N.E.2d 200, 202 (Ind. Ct. App.
1998); State v. Montana Judicial Dist. Court, 933 P.2d 829 (Mont. 1997).
216. See Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d at 604. Justice White dissented to the Supreme Court's
denial ofcertiorari and noted the conflicting circuit decisions concerning the analysis of a restrictive
order directed to the trial participants. See Dow Jones & Co. v. Simon, 488 U.S. 946,946-47 (1988)
(White, J., dissenting).
217. See State v. Montana Judicial Dist. Court, 933 P.2d 829, 841 (Mont. 1997); Rene' L.
Rodd, Note, A PriorRestraintby Any Other Name: The JudicialResponse to Media Challenges
of Gag OrdersDirectedat TrialParticipants,88 MicH. L. REv. 1171, 1172 (1990); see alsoUnited
States v. Cleveland, 128 F.3d 267 (5th Cir. 1997) (sustaining a lower court order concerning "the
deliberations of the jury," upon a finding that the order was "narrowly tailored to prevent a
substantial threat to the administration of justice-namely, the threat presented to freedom of
speech within the jury room by the possibility of post-verdict interviews").
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to know under Article II, Section 9 of the 21Montana
8
Constitution than offered by a reasonableness test.
3. Party and Witness Challenges to Gag Orders
There is disagreement among courts whether participant gag orders are
subject to traditional prior restraint analysis when challenged by the party
gagged. Some courts upholding the issuance of gag orders directed to trial
participants have employed a "reasonable likelihood" standard of review
requiring the court to evaluate whether it is reasonably likely that the
pretrial publicity will jeopardize the accused's right to a fair trial.219 As one
court observed:
[T]he reasonable likelihood standard is susceptible of
objective measurement. It is expressed in straightforward
language, in terminology that is commonly and frequently
used in communications. Whether a particular utterance
creates a reasonable likelihood of affecting trial fairness will
depend upon the special circumstances of each case. This
inquiry involves a careful balancing and consideration of all
relevant factors. These factors can include such matters as the
nature of the statement, the timing of the statement, the extent
to which the information has been publicized, the nature of
the proceeding and its vulnerability to prejudicial influence,
the attorney's status in the case, the lawyer's unique position
as an informed and accurate source of information in the case,
and the effect of unrestricted comment on the
220 interest of the
litigants and the integrity of the proceeding.
Other courts have held that participant gag orders should be viewed as
prior restraints subject to a clear and present danger analysis.221 Under this
analysis a participant gag order is justified only if the prohibited speech
poses "a clear and present danger" to the administration of justice, the
order is "narrowly drawn," and no reasonable alternatives are available

218. Montana JudicialDist. Court, 933 P.2d at 841.
219. See, e.g., Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d at 604; Levine v. United States Dist. Court, 764
F.2d 590, 596 (9th Cir. 1985); In re Russell, 726 F.2d 1007, 1010 (4th Cir. 1984); United States
v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661, 663-67 (10th Cir. 1969); South Bend Tribune, 691 N.E.2d at 202.
220. In re Hinds, 449 A.2d 483, 493 (N.J. 1982) (citations omitted).
221. See United States v. Salameh, 992 F.2d 445,447 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Ford,
830 F.2d 596,600 (6th Cir. 1987); CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234,240 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding
that a participant gag order was a prior restraint on CBS's right to gather news); Breiner v. Takao,
835 P.2d 637, 642 (Haw. 1992).
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having a lesser impact on First Amendment freedoms.' What emerges
from the "clear and present danger" cases is a working principle that the
substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high before a court can impose a gag order on a participant. 23
In some jurisdictions, courts have held that challenges by participants
to participant gag orders are different from third party challenges and
should be judged under a different standard. 22 In In reApplicationofDow
Jones,225 the court specifically held that "there is a fundamental difference
between a gag order challenged by the individual gagged and one
challenged by a third party; an order objected to by the former is properly
characterized as a prior restraint, one opposed solely by the latter is not."226
This holding is defensible on the grounds that although a participant gag
order directly restrains a participant from speaking, it does not directly
restrain a third party such as the media from saying anything. As to a third
party, it only forecloses a source of information that would otherwise be
available. This is arguably a lesser prohibition than a prior restraint and, as
such, should be judged under a less restrictive standard than that applied
to prior restraints. Moreover, since a third party probably has standing to
assert only its own injury and not that of a trial participant, a third party
cannot assert the prior restraint standard (clear and present danger) in
challenging a participant gag order.
4. Attorney Challenges to Gag Orders
Since attorneys representing clients in litigation may be subject to
greater speech limitations than could constitutionally be imposed on other
citizens,227 the speech of lawyers representing clients in pending cases may
be regulated under a less demanding standard than that established for
regulation of the press in Nebraska PressAss'n v. Stuart.21 8 Specifically,
the United States Supreme Court, in Gentile v. State BarofNevada, 29 held

222. Breiner, 835 P.2d at 641.
223. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252,263 (1941). Under the clear and present danger
analysis the court must reach an inescapable conclusion that speech will be prejudicial and that the
threat of prejudice must be "present or imminent." See id. This has also been characterized as the

"high-threshold test."
224. See, e.g., State v. Montana Judicial Dist. C., 933 P.2d 829, 841-42 (Mont. 1997).
225. 842 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1988).
226. IL at 609.
227. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1074-75 (1991) (holding that state
ethics codes can constitutionally prohibit the speech of attorneys in pending cases if it creates a
"substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing" the parties' right to a fair trial); see also United
States v. Salameh, 992 F.2d 445, 447 (2d Cir. 1993); Breiner v. Takao, 835 P.2d 637, 640 (Haw.

1992).
228. 427 U.S. 529, 539-606 (1976).
229. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
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a prohibition against attorney statements having a "'substantial likelihood
of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding"' to be
constitutionally permissible, since it was "designed to protect the integrity
and fairness of a state's judicial system," and "imposes only narrow and
necessary limitations on lawyers' speech." In light of the decision in
31 the American Law Institute in its Restatement of the Law
Gentile,"
Governing Lawyers has stated that the proper standard governing speech
regulation of attorneys in pending cases is the substantial likelihood of
prejudice standard, which approximates the clear and present danger
standard by focusing on the likelihood of injury and its substantiality. 2
Prior to Gentile, some courts upheld the constitutional validity of the
"reasonable likelihood of prejudice" standard for limiting lawyer
extrajudicial comments during criminal trials, 3 relying on the admonition
of Sheppardv. Maxwell that "where there is a reasonable likelihood that
prejudicial news" would prevent a fair trial, the judge should take remedial
action or grant a new trial." 5 Regardless of the standard that governs gag
orders on attorneys, gag orders in general can create problems. For
example, suppose that a news reporter says to an attorney representing a
defendant in a murder case that a police report reflects that the defendant's
fingerprints were all over the gun found at the crime scene. The attorneys
know that the report is false and that if this false report is made public, it
will predispose the community to believe the defendant is guilty. The
attorney is under a typical gag order "not to comment to the press on
230. Id. at 1075. Gentile construed a Nevada Bar Rule patterned after the A.B.A. Model Rule
of Professional Conduct 3.6 ('Trial Publicity") as it applied to a defense attorney's comments made
at a scheduled press conference. See id. at 1032. At the press conference held the day after his
client's indictment, six months before the trial, the defense attorney asserted the innocence of his
client, implicated a police detective in the theft with which his client was charged, accused the
police of a cover up, and accused other witnesses of being drug dealers and money launderers. See
id. at 1040-42. The defense attorney admitted in the disciplinary hearing that he had sought to stop
a wave of publicity he perceived as poisoning the prospective juror pool, prejudicing potential
jurors against his client, and injuring his client's reputation. See id at 1047-48.
231. In evaluating the impact of the Gentile case on the issue of the standard to be applied in
determining the validity of attorney gag orders, it is important to note that Gentile involved a
substantive rule of bar discipline rather than a gag order, additionally, Gentile was a closely
contested five to four decision. See id. at 1031-34. It appears that four Justices would have stuck
with the clear and present danger test, even with respect to lawyers and even in respect to a bar
discipline rule.
232. See RESTATEMENT (TIIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 169 (Tentative Draft Nov.
8, 1997).
233. See Note, A ConstitutionalAssessmentof Court Rules RestrictingLawyer Comment on
Pending Litigation,65 CORNELLL. REV. 1106, 1120-21 (1980).
234. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
235. Id. at 363. An order limiting extrajudicial commentary by trial participants is an
appropriate alternative to restraint on the media. See News-Journal Corp. v. Foxman, 939 F.2d
1499, 1512-13 (citing Sheppard,384 U.S. at 361).
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matters relating to the case." The attorney's statement that the report is
false would create no danger of prejudice to a fair trial. Rather, under these
circumstances, the only effect, if any, would be to mitigate the prejudice
that is likely to occur if the reporter publishes the false report. By obeying
the gag order, the attorney will lose an opportunity to assist in protecting
his or her client's right to a fair trial by speaking out. If, however, the
attorney defies the gag order, is it a defense to a contempt citation that his
or her statements protected rather than undermined a fair trial?
If the general gag order in the above hypothetical case stated that the
attorney was prohibited from making "extrajudicial statements
substantially likely to prejudice a fair trial" or "creating a clear and present
danger of prejudicing a fair trial," whichever standard is deemed
applicable, then the question presented would be whether the attorney's
statements under the particular circumstances violated the court's order,
which they clearly did not under the facts stated. Orders formulated in the
terms stated above, therefore, permit flexibility in their application to
particular circumstances. On the other hand, this flexibility can itself create
uncertainty as to the applicability of the gag order. Consequently, general
gag orders restraining attorney comments can create numerous difficult
issues. This is also true as to general gag orders restraining clients or other
non-attorney participants.
Another issue involving attorney gag orders is the extent to which an
attorney's role as a court officer will subject the attorney to speech
regulations different from non-attorney participants such as parties and
witnesses.236 For example, may persons on trial for serious offenses be
subject to gag orders of the same breadth as those sustainable with respect
to the prosecutor or attorneys for the defense? Ifthe defendant chooses to
do so, may he or she write a letter protesting his or her innocence without
regard to the more limiting restraints governing her attorneys? The Gentile
case would appear to support a "yes" answer to these questions.237
However, as stated previously, some jurisdictions do not apply a clear and
present danger test to participant challenges to participant gag orders. In
such jurisdictions, it appears that the same standards would apply to
attorney as well as to non-attorney challenges to participant gag orders.
5. Ethical Rules Governing Extrajudicial Speech of Attorneys
Representing Clients in Pending Cases
Even in the absence of a gag order, attorneys, as officers of the court,

236. Attorneys are "officers of the court," clients and defendants are not. Does that make a
difference in their respective obligations or accountability for what they presume to say?
237. See generally Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1030 (permitting "substantial likelihood of material
prejudice" test).
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maybe ethically restricted from making extrajudicial statements prejudicial
to a fair trial. Standards used to determine whether extrajudicial speech by
an attorney is prohibited are currently embodied in lawyer ethics rules
governing trial publicity.238 In addition to the "substantial likelihood of
material prejudice" standard presently incorporated into Rule 3.6 of the
A.B.A. ModelRules ofProfessionalConduct,2 39 the three other commonly
applied ethics code formulations are "clear and present danger," 2' "serious
and imminent threat"2' " and "reasonable likelihood" of prejudice. u2
Proponents of the clear and present danger standard cite Bridges v.
3 for the proposition that to pass constitutional muster, a rule
California24
governing speech must use the words "clear and present danger."2 "
However, the United States Supreme Court has observed that:
A rule governing speech, even speech entitled to full
constitutional protection, need not use the words "clear and
present danger" in order to pass constitutional muster.
Mr. Justice Holmes' test was never intended "to express
a technical legal doctrine or to convey a formula for
adjudicating cases." Properly applied, the test requires a court
to make its own inquiry into the imminence and magnitude of
the danger said to flow from the particular utterance and then
to balance the character of the evil, as well as its likelihood,
against the need for free and unfettered expression. The
possibility that other measures will serve the State's interests

238. See Esther Berkowitz-Caballero, Note, In the Aftermath of Gentile: Reconsidering the
Efficacy of Trial Publicity Rules, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 494, 494-551 (1993); John Fletcher,
Commentary, Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada: ABA Model Rule 3.6As the ConstitutionalStandard
for Reviewing DefenseAttorneys' Trial Publicity,46 S.M.U. L. REV. 293, 293-308 (1992); L.S.
Fulstone, Note, Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada: Trialin the "CourtofPublicOpinion" and Coping
with Model Rule 3.6-Where Do We Go From Here?, 37 Viiu. L. REv. 619, 619-62 (1992).
239. MODELRULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 3.6 (1998). Model Rule 3.6 prohibits
the extrajudicial speech of attorneys having a "substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an
adjudicative proceeding." Id.
240. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1068. In Gentile, the Court rejected the view that the First
Amendment requires a state to demonstrate a "clear and present danger" of "actual prejudice or an
imminent threat" before any discipline may be imposed on a lawyer. Id.
241. Id. at 1068-69 n.3. The "serious and imminent threat" formulation derives from Craigv.
Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 373 (1992) in which the United States Supreme Court used this language
interchangeably with "clear and present danger."
242. Id.The ABA's Model CodeofProfessional Responsibility DR7-107 (1983) also employs
the"reasonable likelihood" formulation. DR 7-107 prohibits a lawyer from making an extrajudicial
comment that is "reasonably likely" to interfere with the administration of justice. Id.
243. 314 U.S. 252 (1941). In Bridges the Supreme Court held that publications could not be
punished as contemptuous of the court unless they posed a clear and present danger or a serious and
imminent threat to the administration of justice. See id. at 263.
244. See id.
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In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada,2 6 a five judge majority upheld the
constitutionality of a state disciplinary rule which barred lawyers from
making extrajudicial statements that would have a "substantial likelihood
of materially prejudicing" an adjudicative proceeding. u7 The Court
explained:
We agree with the majority of the States that the "substantial
likelihood of material prejudice" standard constitutes a
constitutionally permissible balance between the First
Amendment rights of attorneys in pending cases and the
State's interest in fair trials.
When a state regulation implicates First Amendment
rights, the Court must balance those interests against the
State's legitimate interest in regulating the activity in
question. The "substantial likelihood" test embodied in Rule
177 is constitutional under this analysis, for it is designed to
protect the integrity and fairness of a state's judicial system,
and it imposes only narrow and necessary limitations on
lawyers' speech. The limitations are aimed at two principal
evils: (1) comments that are likely to influence the actual
outcome of the trial, and (2) comments that are likely to
prejudice the jury venire, even if an untainted panel can
ultimately be found.tS
In declining to apply to the speech of lawyers the extremely strict test
set for regulating comments by the press, Chief Justice Rehnquist
explained that:
Lawyers representing clients in pending cases are key
participants in the criminal justice system, and the State may
demand some adherence to the precepts of that system in
regulating their speech as well as their conduct.... Because
245. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1036 (citations omitted).
246. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991); see also Katrina M. Kelly, The "Impartial" Jury and Media
Overload: Rethinking Attorney Speech Regulationsin the 1990s, 16 N. ILL U. L. REv. 483,487-90
(1996); Cheryl Y. Park, Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, A Lawyer's Right to Speak, 23 W. ST. U.
L. REV. 523 (1996).
247. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1076-77. The Gentile decision was a closely contested five to four
decision with two separate opinions. Justice Kennedy wrote that part ofthe Court'sjudgment which
overturned the sanctions imposed upon Gentile, holding Nevada Rule 177 void for vagueness "[a]s
interpreted by the Nevada Supreme Court," because Gentile legitimately could have viewed the
rule's safe-harbor provision as permitting the comments he made to the press and because the state
court did not provide "any clarifying interpretation." Id. at 1048.
248. Id. at 1075.
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lawyers have special access to information through discovery
and client communications, their extrajudicial statements pose
a threat to the fairness of a pending proceeding since lawyers'
statements are likely to be received as especially
authoritative. 9
It was the view of Justice Kennedy and three other members of the
Court in Part 1B of the majority opinion that it was not necessary to rule
on the constitutionality of the "substantial likelihood of material prejudice"
standard since such formulation approximated the "clear and present
danger" test, and, because there was no real difference between such
standards other than semantic variations .5o Justice Kennedy opined that the
standard requires a case-by-case inquiry into such matters as the nature of
the statement, the timing of the statement, the extent to which the
information has been publicized, the nature of the proceeding and its
vulnerability to prejudicial influence, the attorney's status in the case, the
lawyer's unique position as an informed and accurate source of
information in the case, and the effect of unrestricted comment on the
interests of the litigants and the integrity of the proceeding."1
To protect fair trial rights, courts may utilize ethics code restrictions to
deal with extrajudicial statements by attorneys in pending cases. The court
can simply enter an order directing the attorneys to comply with ethics
code restrictions. 2 If the court does not wish to order compliance with
ethical restrictions on attorneys' extrajudicial speech, the court might
accomplish substantially the same result by directing the attorneys to file
memoranda of law on the applicability of the governing ethics code to the
249. Id. at 1074 (citations omitted). The majority opinion notes that the clear and present
danger test at play in Nebraska Press is nearly equivalent to the "serious and imminent threat"
standard. Seeid. at 1068-69 n.3 (maintaining that several tests, including the "serious and imminent
threaf' standard "arguably approximate 'clear and present danger"'); see also FairTrialand Free
Press, 11 ABA STANDARDS FORCRIMINALJUSTICE § 8-1.1, at 8-11 (2d ed. 1980) ("Mhe serious
and imminent threat terminology was and is a part of the judicial gloss on the clear and present

danger test and is not distinct from it.").
250. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1037. The drafters of Model Rule 3.6 apparently thought the
substantial likelihood of material prejudice formulation approximated the clear and present danger

test. See In re Hinds, 449 A.2d 483,493 (NJ. 1982) (finding the substantial likelihood of material
prejudice standard the linguistic equivalent of clear and present danger); AMERICAN BAR ASs'N,
ANNOTATEDMODELRULESOFPRO-ESSIONALCONDUCr 243 (1984) ("[F]ormulation in Model Rule
3.6 incorporates a standard approximating clear and present danger by focusing on the likelihood
of injury and its substantiality."); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF
LAWYERING: A HANDBOOKONTHE MODELRULEsOFPROFESSiONALCoNDUCr 397 (1985) ('To use
traditional terminology, the danger of prejudice to a proceeding must be both clear (material) and
present (substantially likely).").
251. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1036-37. To assist a lawyer in deciding whether an extrajudicial

statement is problematic, some ethics codes contain "safe harbor" provision, listing statements
which are proper. See, e.g., CAL. RULES OFPROPESSIONALCONDUCt § 5-120(B) (1995).
252. See, e.g., People v. Buttafuco, 599 N.Y.S.2d 419,421 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
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statements being made by the attorneys. The court could also, in some
other pointed manner, bring to the attorneys' attention their ethical
responsibilities and the consequences of failing to meet them. This
approach may, in some cases, rival the effectiveness of a gag order because
the ethics code provisions may be based on the same standards prohibiting
attorney comments as those justifying the entry of a gag order against the
attorneys. Moreover, even if a different standard underlies the ethics code
and the court's gag order power, the ethics code standard might sufficiently
protect the parties' right to a fair trial in the particular case.
D. The CaliforniaExperience
After the O.J. Simpson criminal verdict, California adopted a state bar
rule similar to the one approved in Gentile.2 3 Previously, California had
no rule on pretrial publicity, but instead left regulation to the judge
assigned to the case. However, subsequent to the O.J. Simpson criminal
verdict, the California Legislature passed Senate Bill 254, which demanded
that the state bar develop an. ethical rule to curtail attorneys' statements
outside the courtroom.2 4 Effective October 1, 1995, Rule 5-120 was added
to the California Rules for Professional Conduct, 25 prohibiting attorneys
from making an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would
expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if he or she
knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood
of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.
However, the last part of Rule 5-102 allows a lawyer to make statements
that a "reasonable member would believe is required to protect a client
from the substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not
initiated by the member or the member's client. ' z 6
E. Restrictions on Comments by Judges
The Code of Judicial Conduct prohibits judges from commenting on
pending cases so as to avoid the possibility of undue influence on the
judicial process and the threat to public confidence posed by judges
criticizing each other.2 7 Neitherjudges nor court personnel should disclose
to any unauthorized person information relating to a pending criminal case
that is not part of the public records of the court and that may be prejudicial
to the right of the prosecution or the defense to a fair trial.

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
3A(8)).

See Park, supra note 246, at 546.
See id.
See id.; see Kelly, supra note 246, at 495-96.
CAL RULES OFPROFESSIONALCONDUCr § 5-120(c) (1995).
See In re Inquiry of Broadbelt, 683 A. 2d 543, 548 (N.J. 1996) (interpreting Canon
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Because of the above ethical restrictions, judges are severely limited in
their ability to respond publicly to criticism regarding their handling of
particular cases. In February 1998, the ABA House of Delegates adopted
policies regarding criticism of judges and urged state, local, and territorial
bar associations to adopt programs enabling timely and effective response
to criticisms of state and administrative law judges. 5 The policy statement
supporting the resolution asserts:
The reporting of inaccurate or unjust criticism of judges,
courts, or our system of justice by the news media erodes
public confidence and weakens the administration ofjustice.
It is vital that nonlitigants as well as litigants believe that the
courts, their procedures and decisions are fair and impartial.2 9

VII.

TECHNIQUES TO SELECT A JURY UNTAINTED
BY PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY

The closure of pretrial hearings or the imposition of prior restraints on
the media may be unavailable or insufficient to protect against prejudicial
publicity attending high profile trials. The court may have to take
additional actions to minimize the effects of such publicity as stated by the
United States Supreme Court in Sheppardv. Maxwell260and other cases.26 '
A. Selection of ImpartialJury Through
Use of Searching Voir Dire
Generally, the most effective method of identifying jurors unaffected
by pretrial publicity, and eliminating those who are biased, is a searching
voir dire of prospective jurors.' 2 To assist in the voir dire examination, the
court may direct that prospective jurors fill out a court-approved
questionnaire.263

258. See ABA Adopts Civil Trial Practice Standards, Urges Protection of Judicial
Independence, 66 U.S. L. W. 2478, 2478 (Feb. 10, 1998).
259. Id.
260. 384 U.S. 333, 358-59 (1966).
261. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Remshak, Comment, Truth, Justice, and the Media: An Analysis
of the Public Criminal Trial, 6 SETON HAL CONST. L. J. 1083, 1099 (1996).
262. See Boggs v. State, 667 So. 2d 765, 767 (Fla. 1996); People v. Tyburski, 518 N.W.2d
441, 447 (Mich. 1994); Douglas M. Bates, Jr., Voir Dire Examination in Criminal Jury Trials:
What Is the Proper Scope of Inquiry?, FLA. B. J., Jan. 1996, at 64.

263. See, e.g., FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.431(a)(2). Under this Rule completed forms maybe inspected
in the clerk's office and copies are to be available in court during the voir dire examination for use
by parties and the court. See iL On request in a criminal case, any party must be furnished by the
clerk with a list of the names and addresses ofprospective jurors summoned to try the case, together
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1. Voir Dire Methods
It is the trial court's duty to select a voir dire method that will
sufficiently determine whether or not a prospective juror will be able to
decide the case fairly.2 Permissible voir dire methods include submitting
a questionnaire to the jury,2" questioning of prospective jurors by the
attorneys, 2 56 and individual267 or individually sequestered 261 examination
of jurors by the court. The United States Supreme Court has held that it is
not a denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment for a state to
restrict the voir dire examination of a prospective juror.2 69 The state may
preclude any inquiry about the extent of the juror's knowledge of a heavily
publicized case and limit inquiry solely as to whether the juror, having

previously obtained information about the case, could nonetheless remain

impartial.270 It is advisable, however, once a prospective juror's exposure
to pretrial publicity has been established, to examine the juror individually
outside the presence of other jurors regarding "not only the juror's

with copies of alljury questionnaires returned by them. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.281. Questionnaires
have the advantage of allowing an in-depth exploration of the source, extent, and content of media
exposure foreach potential juror with a minimum of the court's time. However, questionnaires have
the disadvantage of not allowing observation of demeanor which is important in assessing
credibility. Notwithstanding this limitation, "they serve as a useful starting point by allowing
identification of those potential jurors who may be most tainted because of exposure to particularly
prejudicial news items or by extensive exposure." Tyburski, 518 N.W.2d at 449.
264. See United States v. Nash, 910 F.2d 749,753 (1lth Cir. 1990); Davis v. Singletary, 853
F. Supp. 1492, 1516 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
265. See supra note 263.
266. Because the attorneys are more familiar with the complexities and nuances of the case,
they are generally in a better position than the trial judge to ask in-depth questions designed to
uncover hidden bias. However, in attorney-conducted voir dire, there is a risk that the skillful
attorney can inject partiality by establishing rapport and introducing his theory of the case to the
jury. See Tyburski, 518 N.W.2d at 449.
267. Individual voir dire examination of ajuror or jurors apart from the others is designed to
prevent panel contamination by inflammatory answers. See Bates, supra note 262, at 67. The
individual voir dire examination is generally limited to determining whether publicity has
prejudiced a prospective juror.
268. In camera voir dire may be necessary in cases involving matters that create a likelihood
that a prospective juror might be embarrassed to confess his true opinion before an audience. See
Randolph v. State, 562 So. 2d 331,337 (Fla. 1990); Davis v. State, 461 So. 2d 67, 69 (Fla. 1984).
269. The United States Supreme Court has determined that there is no federal constitutional
right to content-based questions in every high publicity case. See Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S.
415, 431 (1908). However, Mu'Min does not limit a court's authority to require a voir dire that
includes content-based questions. See Brian P. Coffey, Note, Mu'Minv. Virginia: Reexamining the
Needfor Content QuestioningDuring VoirDirein High Profile Criminal Cases, 13 PACE L.REV.
605,627-29 (1993); Magdalena Gonzales, Note, Mu'Min v. Virginia: Jury Partialityandthe Role
of Content QuestionsDuring Voir Dire, 18 T. MARSHALLL. REV. 161, 170 (1992).
270. See supranote 268.
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subjective self-evaluation of [their] ability to remain impartial but also the
objective nature of the material and degree of exposure."27' The court
should allow jurors the opportunity to request an in camera voir dire
regarding confidential matters.272
2. Pre-Trial Investigation of Jurors
In jurisdictions where the parties have access to the names of venire
members prior to trial, it is not uncommon for attorneys to investigate the
backgrounds of prospective jurors to obtain information that might be
relevant to potential challenges. 273 Miami criminal defense attorney Roy
Black, defending NBC sportscaster Mary Albert in a sexual assault trial in
Virginia, retained a professional polling firm to telephone local residents
to determine the "community feelings" regarding Albert. 4 The trial court
declined to order Black to cease conducting the telephone polls but did rule
that no
person contacted would be allowed to serve on the jury for the
75
2

case.

3. Exclusion of Jurors
If, after the examination of any prospectivejuror, the court believes that
the juror cannot be impartial due to prejudice, the court should excuse the
juror.276 To save the court time and effort, in some cases it may be
advisable to excuse a prospective juror who manifests an unwillingness to
place their family, career, or salary on hold during the term of extended
jury service in a high profile case.2 " If the court does not excuse a juror,
either party may then challenge thejuror, as provided by law. Challenges
to the individual jurors are subdivided into challenges for cause and
271. State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1173 (Ariz. 1993).

272. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 464 U.S. 501,502 (1984); Jay M.
Zitter, Annotation, Validity of Jury Selection asAffected by Accused's Absencefrom Conducting
of Proceduresfor Selection and Impanelingof FinalJury PanelforSpecific Case, 33 A.LR. 4TH

429 (1984).
273. See United States v. Lehder-Rivas, 667 F. Supp. 827, 827 (M.D. Fla. 1987).
274. Telephone interview with Roy Black, Jr., partner, Black, Srebnik & Kornspan, P.A. (Feb.

28, 1998).
275. See Commonwealth of Virginia v. Albert, Case Nos. 97-913 and 97-914 (Va. Dist. Ct.

1997).
276. See Bowling v. Commonwealth, 942 S.W.2d 293,299 (Ky. 1997).
277. During thejury selection in the second Oklahoma City Bombing case, it was reported that

numerous jurors expressed unwillingness to place their family, careers and possibly their salaries
on "hold" during an extended term ofjury service. See Slow Going in Bombing Trial: Prospective
JurorsFind Variety of Reasons to Avoid Serving, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 6, 1997, at 3A.
278. Often, challenges to prospective jurors are made by counsel at a voir dire bench
conference at which the defendant has a right to be present. See Coney v. State, 653 So. 2d 1009,
1013 (Fla. 1995).
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peremptory challenges.279
a. Challenges for Cause
If the court sustains a challenge for cause of an individual juror, the
juror should be discharged from the trial.2"' Jurors subject to a challenge
for cause include those who are incapable of impartiality due to the effects
of prejudicial pretrial publicity.2 '
b. Peremptory Challenges
Peremptory challenges permit the parties to exclude, in a
nondiscriminatory manner,"' jurors they could not challenge for cause.
The number of peremptory challenges and the procedure for their exercise
are covered by statute or state rule.2" 3 While peremptory challenges give
the parties wider opportunity to secure a jury they consider balanced, in
recent years peremptory challenges have been the subject of criticism.'
4. Alternate Jurors
In a high profile, case it is advisable for the court to empanel a number
of alternate jurors to replace jurors who become unable or disqualified to
perform their duties.' Alternate jurors should go through the same
selection process, have the same qualifications, take the same oath, and
have the same functions, powers, facilities, and privileges as the regular
jurors. Alternate jurors have been used to replace jurors where, during a
trial, the court discovers that during voir dire a principal juror concealed
information pertinent to their qualifications.286

279. It is error to force a defendant to exhaust their peremptory challenges on jurors who
should have been excused for cause. See Smith v. State, 510 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
280. It is within the trial court's province to determine whether a challenge for cause is proper,
and the trial court's determination ofjuror competency will not be overturned absent manifest error.
See Mendoza v. State, 700 So. 2d 670, 675 (Fla. 1997).
281. What has been termed "specific prejudice involves attitudes and beliefs about the
particular case that may cause the juror to be incapable of deciding guilt or innocence with an
impartial mind. These attitudes and beliefs may exist because of personal knowledge about the case,
publicity through mass media, or public discussion and rumor arising in the community from which
the jurors are drawn." Neil Vidmar, Pretrial Prejudice in Canada: A Comparative Perspective on
the Criminal Jury, 79 JUDICATURE 249 (1996); see also McGinn v. State. 961 S.W.2d 161, 163
(Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
282. There is an initial presumption that peremptory challenges will be exercised in a
nondiscriminatory manner. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995).
283. See, e.g., State v. Dishon, 687 A.2d 1074, 1083 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997).
284. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMNAL JUSTICE § 15-2.6 (2d ed. 1980).
285. See, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.43(g), 3.280.
286. See State v. Tresvant, 359.So. 2d 524, 526 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
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B. Postponementof Trial
The postponement of trial to allow public attention to subside may help
eliminate the impact of prejudicial pretrial publicity on potential jurors.287
For example, in the Oklahoma bombing trial of Timothy McVeigh, the
defense sought a continuance to counteract pretrial publicity surrounding
the defendant's alleged confession.28 8

C. Change of Venue
Venue refers to the county or other geographical location where a case
is to be tried.28 9 Venue is fixed primarily by constitutional or statutory
provision. 290 Even when a defendant is guaranteed a right to trial by an
impartial jury in the geographical location where a crime has been
committed, due process requires a change of venue when an impartial jury
cannot be impaneled in that location.2 91
1. Criteria for Change of Venue
A party should move for a change of venue when the community where
the case is to be tried harbors so great a prejudice against the moving party
that the moving party cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial in that
community. 2' The moving party has the obligation to justify the need for
a change of venue by proving that the trial will be held in an inherently
prejudicial environment or by showing actual juror prejudice during voir
dire.293 While the trial court may rule on a motion for change of venue prior
to the commencement of jury selection, in doubtful cases, it is preferable
for the court to attempt to empanel an impartial jury and reserve ruling on

287. The Supreme Court recognized in cases of "extraordinary public moment" the court's
authority to stayproceedings if thepublic welfare or convenience willbepromoted thereby. Clinton
v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636, 1650 (1997).
288. See United States v. McVeigh, 955 F. Supp. 1281, 1281 (D. Colo. 1997).
289. Venue should be distinguished from vicinage which refers to the right of a criminal
defendant to be tried by ajury drawn from the area in which the crime occurred. See, e.g., People
v. Gbadebo-Soda, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 40,45 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
290. See 77 AM. JUR. 2D Venue § 5 (1997).
291. State laws restricting venue must on occasion yield to the constitutional requirement that
the state afford the defendant a fair trial. See Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 511 (1971).
292. See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031-32 (1984); Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794,
798-99 (1975); Groppi, 400 U.S. at 510 (1971) (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961)).
293. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966). The determination of whether to
change venue is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court; its decision will not be disturbed
on appeal absent a showing of prejudice to the substantial rights of the defendant. See id. The
burden is on the defendant to show prejudice exists in the community, not as a matter of
speculation, but as a demonstrable reality. See id.
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the motion until it becomes apparent during jury selection that an unbiased
jury cannot be seated.2"
2. Pretrial Publicity
To justify a change of venue on grounds of prejudicial pretrial publicity,
the burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that prejudicial pretrial
publicity makes it impossible to seat an impartial jury.295 Generally, in the
absence of evidence that pretrial publicity is presumptively prejudicial, the

moving party must demonstrate that pretrial publicity resulted in actual

prejudice that prevented the impaneling of an impartial jury.296 Actual jury
prejudice occurs where a sufficient number of the jury panel have such
fixed opinions that they cannot "judge impartially the guilt of the
defendant, so that it is clear that a trial before that panel would be
inherently prejudicial .,291 "[A] key factor in gauging the reliability ofjuror
assurances of impartiality is the
percentage of veniremen who 'will admit
' 29
to a disqualifying prejudice.'
The movant must prove three elements to show that pretrial publicity

was presumptively prejudicial. "[T]he publicity must: (1) be sensational,
inflammatory, slanted towards conviction rather than factual and objective;
(2) have revealed that the accused had a prior criminal record or referred
to confessions, admissions or reenactments of the crime by the accused; or
(3) have been derived from reports from the police and prosecuting

294. See Provenzano v. State, 497 So. 2d 1177, 1182-83 (Fla. 1986); Davis v. State, 461 So.
2d 67, 69 (Fla. 1984); Manning v. State, 378 So. 2d 274, 276 (Fla. 1979).
295. The existence of extensive pretrial publicity by itself does not necessarily create a right
to change of venue because "[u]sually, despite pretrial publicity, voir dire examination is a
sufficient mechanism to insure that a defendant obtains a fair and impartial trial." Stouffer v. State,
703 A.2d 861, 881 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997). See also State v. Hill, 493 S.E.2d 264, 270 (N.C.
1997); McGinn v. State, 961 S.W.2d 161,164 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (explaining that even though
some members of venire are challengeable for cause due to attitudes generated by publicity, it does
not mean that an impartial jury cannot be empaneled, as required for change of venue, due to
pretrial publicity).
296. Prejudice can be either presumed or actual. "Prejudice is presumed when the record
demonstrates that the community where the trial was held was saturated with prejudicial and
inflammatory mediapublicity aboutthe crime." Ainsworth v. Calderon, 138 F.3d787, 795 (9th Cir.
1998). "An additional factoris whether the media accounts were primarily factual, as such accounts
tend to be less prejudicial than inflammatory editorials or cartoons. A final factor is whether the
media accounts contained inflammatory, prejudicial information that was not admissible at trial."
Id. Prejudice is rarely presumed because "saturation" defines conditions found only in extreme
situations. To establish actual prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate that the jurors exhibited
"actual partiality or hostility that could notbe laid aside." United States v. Collins, 109 F.3d 1413,
1416, 1417 (9th Cir. 1997).
297. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794,802-03 (1975); see also Oats v. State, 446 So. 2d 90,
93 (Fla. 1984); Moyen v. State, 225 So. 2d 458,459 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968).
298. Henyard v. State, 689 So. 2d 239 (Fla.1996).
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officers." 2' "However, even if one of these elements exists, a change of
venue may not be necessary where there has been a sufficient time between
the publication and the trial for the prejudice to dissipate."'
3. Conformity Prejudice
A change of venue may be required when strong community feeling
about the case results injuror perception about what is expected regarding
the case outcome. 3 ' For example, during the Oklahoma bombing trial of
Timothy McVeigh, the court changed venue from Oklahoma because the
entire state had become a unified community, sharing the emotional trauma
of those who had been directly victimized.' Also, venue for the trial of an
Hispanic police officer who shot and killed the African-American driver
of a motorcycle was changed on the theory that jurors would be reluctant
to vote for acquittal for fear of causing further violence in their

community. 3

4. Other Considerations
Before ordering a change of venue, the court should balance the need
for such action against other considerations. These considerations include
the expense of moving the trial, the defendant's right to a speedy trial, the
inconvenience to all parties of moving the trial, the potential for bias at the
target jurisdiction, and the target jurisdiction's comparative demographic
composition.3' Some states have adopted procedures allocating costs and
expenses between the jurisdiction where the action originated and the
jurisdiction receiving the case after change of venue.' 5
Once it becomes likely that the court will order a change of venue, the
appropriate officials should attempt to locate a venue with a similar
demographic composition that is willing to accept the case. The court to
which a case is transferred should be equipped with a courthouse and
courtrooms large enough to accommodate the case without disrupting other
court business.

299. Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 701 A.2d 492,504 (Pa. 1997).
300. IdL
301. See Henyard, 689 So. 2d at 245; Berry v. State, 481 S.E.2d 203,207 (Ga. 1997); Bell v.
State, 938 S.W.2d 35,46 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Henley v. State, 576 S.W.2d 66,72 (rex. Crim.
App. 1979 (en banc)); Valerie P. Hans, The ContestedRole of the Civil Jury in BusinessLitigation,
79 JUDICATURE 242 (1996).
302. See United States v. McVeigh, 955 F. Supp. 1281, 1282 (D. Colo. 1997).
303. See Lozano v. State, 584 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).
304. In Florida, after the court orders a change of venue, it shall, upon a motion of any party,
"give priority to any county which closely resembles the demographic composition of the county
wherein the original venue would lie." FIA STAT. § 910.03(2) (1997).
305. See FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.180 (1998).
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D. Change of Venire
Alternatives to granting a full-scale change of venue should be explored
before moving the trial, including the selection of an out-of-county jury.
Florida has adopted a statute authorizing the court to select a jury from a
county other than where the offense was committed and upon completion
of jury selection, bring the jury to the county where the offense was
committed for trial. 3" The selection of such an out-of-county jury is proper
only if the court finds both a fair and impartial jury cannot be empaneled
in the county where the offense was committed, and the court determines
that once a jury is selected it shall be sequestered." 7
E. Severance of Defendants
In cases in which there is a substantial likelihood that one or more of
the defendants will not receive a fair trial because of potentially prejudiced
publicity against another defendant, severance (trying one defendant
separately from another higher-profile co-defendant) is another remedy for
extensive prejudicial publicity."8
F. Dual Juries
In multi-defendant cases where there is a basis for severing the trials of
codefendants, trial judges may wish to consider using dual juries to
minimize the exposure of potential jurors in the second trial to
media
reports of the first and to avoid the time and expense of multiple trials.
When this procedure is followed, two independent juries are selected and
sworn. The parties may wish to make separate opening statements unless
the prosecution agrees not to refer to any inadmissible evidence. Separate
closing arguments are required. When evidence inadmissible against a
codefendant is presented, that codefendant's jury must be removed from
the courtroom. Although this procedure has some obvious inherent
problems, it has generally been upheld."'
VIII. MIwIIG PREm ICIAL PUBLICITY
DURiNG TRIAL

The Supreme Court has endorsed various techniques to protect the
judicial process from prejudicial outside influences during trial. One of the
most common of these techniques is sequestration. "A jury is sequestered
306. See FLA. STAT. § 710.03(3) (1997).

307. See id.
308. See ABA STANDARDS FoR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 8-3.4 (2d ed. 1980).

309. See, e.g., Velez v. State, 596 So. 2d 1197, 1199 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).
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by being kept together in the charge of an officer of the court so as to be
secluded from outside communication."31 Sequestration of the jury is
discretionary with the court and should be ordered only if it is determined
that the case is of such notoriety or the issues are of such a nature that, in
the absence of sequestration, there is a substantial likelihood that highly
prejudicial matters will come to the attention of the jurors.1 If jurors are
sequestered, a "neutral" instruction should be given by the court "to
prevent any negative inference being drawn by the jurors from the
sequestration order. 31 2 Even when not sequestered overnight, the court
must ensure
that the jurors do not mix with the public, press, or parties to
313
case.
the
Many judges are reluctant to sequester jurors as evidenced by nonsequestering in the O.J. Simpson civil trial.314 There are several reasons
why courts disfavor sequestration. First, sequestering the jury is
burdensome and imposes high costs on the court.31 Extended sequestration
"can [also] breed jury resentment, encouraging the very anti-defendant bias
that the court sought to prevent.' 31 6 Finally, "sequestration does not shield
jurors from exposure to pretrial publicity prior to their selection to the
venire," meaning
information may be "piped" to jurors via conjugal or
317
family visits.

IX. PROTECTION OF JUROR PRIVACY DURING TRIAL
Extensive publicity attending a high profile trial can create substantial
intrusion into the privacy of jurors and possibly affect their verdict. To
protect jurors' privacy and guard against potential adverse impacts on jury
deliberations resulting from such publicity, as well as from other factors,
the court may decide to limit media and public access to jurors' names and
addresses. In extreme circumstances, the judge may empanel an
anonymous jury.

310. State v. Alien, 682 So. 2d 713,727 (La. 1996).
311. The rule of sequestration does not "bar communication between thejudge and jury when
such communication is within the bounds of trial related necessity." Id.
312. United States v. EI-Jassem, 819 F. Supp. 166, 177 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).

313. See United States v. Muyet, 945 F. Supp. 586, 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
314. See generallyMarcy Strauss, Sequestration,24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 63 (1996) (discussing all

aspects of sequestration).
315. See United States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539, 1561 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Greer,
806 F.2d 556, 557 (5th Cir. 1986).
316. Stephen J. Krause, Note, Punishing the Press: Using Contempt of Court to Secure the
Right to a Fair Trial, 76 B.U. L. REV. 537, 565 (1996).
317. Id.
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A. Anonymous Juries
The practice of withholding the names ofjurors from the parties at voir
dire is commonly referred to as the empaneling an anonymous jury.31 8 This
practice generally has been limited to exceptional circumstances. "The
defendant's involvement in organized crime; his participation in a group
with the capacity to harm jurors or past attempts to interfere with the
judicial process; the potential punishment faced by the defendant; the
degree of publicity the trial had received; and the possibility of juror
harassment" are factors a court should consider in determining whether to
impanel an anonymous jury.319
B. Limiting Pressand PublicAccess to
Jurors'Names andAddresses
To protect juror privacy and prevent intimidation, lower courts have
recognized a judge's right to withhold jurors' names and addresses from
the public,3" and to use juror identification numbers instead of names.321
For example, in the case of the suspected Unabomber, Theodore
Kaczynski, Federal Judge Garland Burrell ruled that the court would
withhold the jurors' names, ages, and occupations from the public until the
case ended. He also barred the media from photographing or sketching
prospective jurors. The judge cited as the basis for his ruling "the
combination of the extensive publicity . . . the media's efforts to
interrogate any and all individuals connected to the trial and the efforts by
the public to contact and threaten witnesses." 3" Various states have
adopted court rules or statutes limiting access to names and addresses of
jurors under various circumstances. 23
318. See United States v. Wong, 40 F.3d 1347, 1376 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Tutino,
883 F.2d 1125, 1132-33 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1017, 1021-22 (3d
Cir. 1988); United States v. Persico, 832 F.2d 705, 717-718 (2d Cir. 1987); Muyet, 945 F. Supp.

at 590. The empaneling of an anonymous jury has "serious implications for a defendant's interest
in effectively conducting voir dire and in maintaining the presumption of innocence." Ephraim
Margolin & Gerald F. Uelmen, The Anonymous Jury: Jury TamperingbyAnother Name?, CRIM.
JUST., Fall 1994, at 14,17; see also United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 134 (2d Cir. 1979). In
the meantime, safeguards to protect these jurors must be provided. See United States v. Ross, 33
F.3d 1507, 1519-22 (11th Cir. 1994).
319. David Weinstein, Note, ProtectingaJuror'sRighttoPrivacy: ConstitutionalConstraints
and Policy Options, 70 TEMP. L. REv. 21, 27 (1997).
320. See United States v. Antar, 839 F. Supp. 293, 305 (D. NJ. 1993); Gannett Co., Inc. v.

State, 571 A.2d 735,748 (Del. 1989); Times Publ'g Co. v. State, 632 So. 2d 1072, 1074 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1994).
321. See People v. Goodwin, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 576, 581 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that

there is no constitutional right to have jurors' names announced in court).
322. UnabomberJurorNames to be Secret, MIMu HERALD, Oct. 4, 1997, at 16A.

323. See, e.g., CAL. CODE OFCIV. P. § 237(a)(1), (b) (West 1998).
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X. TECHNIQUES TO INCREASE JURY INVOLVEMENT

DuIN TRIAL

Courts should develop techniques to ensure that jurors feel like
participants in the legal process rather than passive observers who must
wait until a trial ends before playing their part. The court can increase juror
participation by allowing jurors to take notes and ask questions of
witnesses.324 Juror involvement should also be encouraged by providing the

jurors with explanations for prolonged delays, phone accessibility, and
comfortable seating in the jury lounge.
A. JurorNotetaking and Notebooks
In many states, jurors are permitted to take notes for their own use

during deliberations. 3" Where note-taking is permitted, jurors should be

instructed that they may not share their notes with other jurors. Note
sharing improperly places a notetaking326 juror's recollection above the
recollections of a non-notetaking juror.
The A.B.A. House of Delegates, at its meeting in February 1998,
adopted new Civil Trial Practice Standards intended to help juries by

providing procedures for use when courts permit practices such as juror
note-taking. These standards also approve the practice of providing jurors

with notebooks which include such items as preliminary instructions,
selected exhibits, stipulations, short statements of the parties' claims and

defenses, glossaries and chronologies.327 It is also recommended that the

trial judge "supervise [the] preparation of the notebooks to assure that they
328
are useful to the jurors and that neither side has an unfair advantage.,
B. QuestioningBy Jurors

In some jurisdictions, jurors are allowed to pose questions to witnesses.
For example, Palm Beach County Court Judge Nelson Bailey reports that

324. See Larry Heuer& StevenPenrod, IncreasingJurorParticipation
in TrialsThroughNote
Taking and Question Asking, 79 JUDICATURE 256, 256 (1996).
325. Cases discussing the taking and use of notes by ajury are collected and analyzed in Sonja
Larsen, Taking and Use of Trial Notes by Jury, 36 A.L.R. 5th 255 (1996); see also Harold J.
Bursztajn et al., Keeping a Jury Involved During a Long Trial, ClM. JUST., Winter 1997, at 8;
Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, IncreasingJurors'Participation
in Trials:A FieldExperimentWith
Jury Notetaking and Question Asking, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 231, 231 (1988); David L.
Rosenhan et al., Notetaking Can Aid JurorRecall,18 LAW&HUM. BEHAV. 53,53-54 (1994).
326. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 887 S.W.2d 957, 958 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
327. See Attorneys-BarAssociations: ABA Adopts Civil Trial PracticeStandards, Urges
Protectionof JudicialIndependence, 66 U.S.L.W. 2478 (Feb. 10, 1998).
328. Interview with Judge Michael B. Dann, Waking Up Jurors,Shaking Up Courts,TRIAL,
July 1997, at 20, 21.
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he routinely tells jurors in his courtroom that "if a witness does not provide
all the answers," the jurors "can do probing of their own."32' 9 Usually,
questions are solicited in writing from the jurors and posed to the witness
by the court after the lawyers have had a chance to object.33 ° Studies by the
American Judicature Society, the State Justice Institute, and other
organizations have shown that allowing jurors to ask questions keeps them
alert, focuses their attention on relevant issues, and enhances their sense of
participation and responsibility. Judges find these benefits especially
valuable in complex cases.331
C. Expediting Trial Time
To ensure that jurors are not unduly burdened, the court should take
steps to expedite trials, including limiting the length of arguments by
counsel and the number of witnesses each party can call, when possible. To
avoid keeping the jury waiting, the court should generally devote the trial
day to the uninterrupted presentation of evidence. Objections, motions, and
other matters that may interrupt the trial should, as much as possible, be
heard at a time set aside for that purpose, before the jury arrives in the
morning or after it leaves in the afternoon. Motions in limine,332 pretrial
conferences, and protective orders often help shorten trial, simplify issues,
and reduce the possibility of mistrial.3 33
D. JurorPay andAccommodations
Although a juror's right to compensation is purely statutory and a
matter of legislative, and not judicial, prerogative, 3 the low jury pay in
many states may discourage potential jurors from serving for financial
reasons. Various committees have recommended an increase injury fees,
with employers paying the juror their regular salary for the first three to
five days of jury service.335

329. MIAMi DAILY BUSINESS REVIEW,Oct. 9, 1997.
330. See Pierre v. State, 601 So. 2d 1309, 1309 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).
331. See Bursztajn et al., supra note 325, at 9.
332. A motion in limine is similar to a protective order in that it seeks to prohibit any reference
to offending evidence at trial by first having its admissibility determined outside the presence of the
jury. See Benson v. Shuler Drilling Co., Inc., 871 S.W.2d 552,555 (Ark. 1994); 75 AM. JUR. 2D
Trial § 94 (1991).
333. See Rosa v. Florida Power & Light Co., 636 So. 2d 60, 61 (Fla.2d DCA 1994).
334. See Patierno v. State, 391 So. 2d 391, 393 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
335. See B. Michael Dann & George Logan, mJ, Jury Reform: The Arizona Experience, 79
JuDICATURE 280, 284 (MarJApr. 1996).
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E. Instructionsto Jurors
Particularly in a complex case, the judge should consider giving
comprehensive instructions to jurors before allowing opening statements
to begin. At a minimum, the instructions should deal with pertinent legal
concepts and provide an outline of the issues in dispute and related burdens
of proof. During trial recesses, the trial judge should not say anything to
jurors that they might interpret as an instruction on the law.336 If the jurors
request instructions on the law during recesses, such requests should be
received only in the presence of the parties and their attorneys.33 7
XI. DUTY TO REGULATE CONDUCT AND
ATMOSPHERE OF TRIAL

It is crucial in a high profile case that the presiding judge assume full
command of the proceeding and regulate the conduct and atmosphere of
the trial.33 The two most noted cases presuming prejudice due to a carnival
or circus atmosphere at trial are Sheppard v. Maxwell339 and Estes v.
Texas? °
The trial in Estes had been conducted in a circus atmosphere,
due in large part to the intrusions of the press, which was
allowed to sit within the bar of the court and to overrun it
with television equipment. Similarly, Sheppardarose from a
trial infected not only by a background of extremely
inflammatory publicity but also by a courthouse given over to
accommodate the public appetite for carnival. The
proceedings in these cases were entirely lacking in the
solemnity and sobriety to which a defendant is entitled in a
to any notion of fairness and rejects the
system that subscribes
3 41
verdict of a mob.
A. Regulation of In-Court Conduct of Spectators
Since the public has the right to watch the trial, but not to participate in
it or indicate a desired outcome, the presiding judge should strictly forbid
336. See Mendoza v. State, 700 So. 2d 670,674 (Fla. 1997).
337. See id.
338. See Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560,572 (1986); State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1172
(Ariz. 1993).
339. 384 U.S. 333,382 (1966).
340. 381 U.S. 532,605 (1965).
341. Bible, 858 P.2d at 1171 (quoting Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794,799 (1975)); see also
Samuel H. Pillsbury, Time, TV, and CriminalJustice:Second Thoughts on the Simpson Trial,33
CRm. L. BULTL 3, 26 (1997).
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spectators' tactics designed to influence the jury and be prepared to deal
with those who attempt to do so. 342 For example, in United States v.
Yahweh,' 3 the judge was faced with a courtroom containing forty to fifty
uniformed members of a religious cult.3' The judge barred the uniformed
spectators from the courtroom, holding that their presence was
prejudicial. 3' 5 Likewise, the court "in the high profile 'Central Park Jogger'
case, barred a spectator-brother of one of [the] defendants from wearing a
black sweatshirt with the letters emblemized in white, 'My Brother Antron
McCray Is Innocent.'346
B. HandlingPro Se Litigants
A defendant in a state criminal trial has a constitutional right to proceed
without counsel if they voluntarily and intelligently elect to do so. Because
lay people are generally unfamiliar with court procedures and applicable
substantive and procedural law, a trial judge will often have difficulty in
trying a criminal case where the defendant waives counsel and proceeds
pro se, especially if the defendant is obstreperous and misbehaves in court.
Publicity can provide an incentive for a pro se litigant to be disruptive.
Such conduct can challenge the court's ability, in the public's eye, to
effectively administer justice. This consideration may make it especially
important for the court to appoint stand-by counsel to consult with the
defendant concerning court procedure and law. The trial will often be more
expeditiously conducted if stand-by counsel is available to assist the
defendant-although such an assignment is often a frustrating and tedious
job for counsel.'?
342. See David E. Westman, Note, Handling the Problem Criminal Defendant in the
Courtroom: The Use of Physical RestraintsandExpulsion in the Modern Era, 2 SAN DIEGO JUST.
J. 507,527-28 (1994).
343. 779 F. Supp. 1342 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
344. See id. at 1344.
345. See id.
346. People v. Pennisi, 563 N.Y.S.2d 612,616 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (citation omitted).
347. See Behr v. Bell, 665 So. 2d 1055, 1056 (Fl. 1996); Jones v. State, 449 So. 2d 253,257
(Fla. 1984). Jones concerned a criminal defendant who refused to cooperate with the trial court and
with court-appointed counsel in their efforts to provide legal assistance. See id. at 256. The court
stated that
it was prudent of the court to appoint standby counsel, even over defendant's
objection, to observe the trial in order to be prepared, as well as possible, to
represent defendant in the event it became necessary to restrict or terminate selfrepresentation by shackling and gagging defendant or by removing him from the
courtroom.

Id. at 257.
The purpose of standby counsel is to assist the court in conducting orderly and timely
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Special security concerns may arise in high profile cases involving pro
se litigants. As in all cases, judges must take prompt action if they are
threatened or harassed by such litigants. It is important however, to
distinguish a "true threat" from the "hundreds of 'crackpot
communications' which... [a court] receives each year from frustrated
' ' Instituting a criminal prosecution against
and/or unschooled litigants. M
such defendants may be appropriate under the statutes of some
jurisdictions.349 If circumstances require it, security personnel should attend
at all times a pro se litigant appears in court or chambers.5 At the very
least, all chambers and courtrooms should have an "emergency button" to
summon security. Finally, courts should take steps, where necessary, to
insulate witnesses and jurors from tampering or intimidation by such
defendants.
Additional remedies also may be needed to protect a pro se litigant's
right to self-representation while providing adequate security in the
courtroom and control of the trial. In Parker v. Norris,5 1 the court
approved the use of a transparent plexiglass screen around the witness
stand separating the pro se defendant from the witnesses whom the
defendant was examining.3 2 By use of such screen, the defendant could
walk around during the course of the trial without any handcuffs or other
forms of restraint, although a deputy sheriff sat immediately behind the
defendant at the counsel table. 3
XII. POST VERDICT JUROR PRIVACY

Jurors, even after completing their duty, are entitled to privacy and to
protection against harassment.Y Jurors have no obligation to speak to the

proceedings. See id. at 258; see also McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 169 (1984); Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806, 820-821 (1975).
348. Melugin v. Hames, 38 F.3d 1478, 1484 (9th Cir. 1994).
349. See id.
350. In Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986) the Court determined that "the conspicuous,
or at least noticeable, deployment of security personnel in a courtroom during trial is [not an]
inherently prejudicial practice" and does not violate the fundamental principles of the criminal
justice system, ld at 568.
351. 859 F. Supp. 1203 (E.D. Ark. 1994).
352. See id. at 1225.
353. See id.; see also United States v. Lampley, 127 F.3d 1231, 1237 (10th Cir. 1997)
("[Nioting that guards have become commonplace in most public places 'so long as their numbers
or weaponry do not suggest particular official concern or alarm.').
354. California passed a statute in 1995 requiring that jurors' identities be sealed following
a criminal verdict. See CAL CODE OF CIV. P. § 237(2) (West 1998). Any person can then petition
for this information, which could be released upon an undefined showing of "good cause," provided
there was no "compelling interest' against disclosure. See § 237(4)(b). If such a petition is filed,
a complicated hearing process is set in motion. See § 237(4)(c). At the hearing, individual jurors
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news media or anyone else about their service. The juror's freedom of
speech is also the freedom not to speak.355 Since there is a lack of
agreement as to how jurors and the press should deal with each other after
a trial has ended,356 a model post-verdict jury instruction has been
published for use by the court and jurors.357 As a caveat, courts should
instruct jurors not to divulge anything said or done in the jury room by any
of the other jurors, including opinions expressed, or votes cast by fellow
jurors.358 Most jurisdictions have rules that prohibit attorneys from
interviewing jurors after a trial without the court's permission, and also
strictly limit the scope of any allowed inquiry.35 9 The United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari in a case upholding a trial court order
prohibiting juror interviews concerning the deliberations of the jury, upon
a finding that the order was "narrowly tailored to prevent a substantial
threat to the administration of justice-namely, the threat presented to
within the jury room by the possibility of post-verdict
freedom of 'speech
36°
interviews.
Another concern is "checkbook journalism," the sale of stories by
witnesses and jurors. For example, in California, the court may admonish
jurors that, "prior to discharge, [they may not] accept, agree to accept, or

may object to the release of their names and can essentially veto the disclosure of their identities.
See § 237(4)(c). To ensure that information is not released in violation of these strictures, the statute
attaches misdemeanorpenalties to court personnel who release jurors' names without authority. See
§ 237(e). The purpose of this statute, according to the legislative history, was to protect "jurors'
privacy, safety and well-being," along with public confidence in and willingness to participate in
the jury system.
355. See United States v. Hooshmand, 931 F.2d 725, 737 (11th Cir. 1991); Benjamin M.
Lawsky, Limitations on Attorney Postverdict Contact with Jurors:Protectingthe CriminalJury
and Its Verdict at the Expense of the Defendant,94 CoLuM. L. REv. 1950, 1960-77 (1994); Nancy
A. Novak, Jury on Trial: Juror'sConstitutionalRight to Privacy Falls Under Scrutiny of the
Courts, 3 SAN DiEGo JUST. J. 215, 215 (1995).
356. If a case is settled midway into the trial, it may be unwise for the jurors to reveal their
thought process to the media since all the evidence has not yet been presented.
357. See Arthur Murphy & Christine Kellett, Meet the Press: How the Court Can Prepare
Jurors,CRIM. JUST., Winter 1996, at 8, 49-50.
358. It is virtually taken for granted that what goes on in the jury room should stay in the jury
room. For instance, judges routinely instruct jurors not to speak to anyone about a case prior to
retiring for deliberations and once deliberations commence to talk only to fellow jurors. See United
States v. Antar, 839 F. Supp. 293, 307 (D.N.J. 1993). Court security officers are posted outside of
jury rooms to guard against intrusions. Where the risks of intrusion are high,juries are sequestered.
The danger in allowing unfettered probing into juror deliberations is found in the discouragement
of the free and open operation of the deliberative process. See id. at 305-07. See generally Note,
PublicDisclosuresofJuryDeliberations,96 HARV. L. REV. 886,887 (1983) (recognizing that postverdict interviews ofjurors are "more widespread than ever before").
359. See Baptist Hosp., Inc. v. Maler, 579 So. 2d 97, 100 (Fla. 1991); Lawsky, supra note 355,
at 1955-57.
360. United States v. Cleveland, 128 F.3d 267,270 (5th Cir. 1997).
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benefit... [in] consideration for supplying any information concerning the
trial.' 3 61Also, in California, a prospective witness who accepts payment in
exchange for information pertaining to a criminal trial is subject to
prosecution.36 Such laws, however, raise constitutional issues.363
XIII. CONCLUSION
The proper administration of justice in America is essential to
maintaining the appropriate balance between social order and individual
rights. The due process concept which embodies the principle of
fundamental fairness is not a constitutional luxury-it is a regulating
principle that impacts our expectations ofjustice in the courtroom as well
as many aspects of American culture. Our societal well being is therefore
dependent, in part, on our justice system's ability to provide due process
in reality and in appearance.
The ability of our courts to provide due process is severely tested in
high profile cases that pit the right of a fair trial against the right to
freedom of speech and of the press in the context of massive publicity. The
public perception of justice in our courts is, therefore, highly affected by
the judicial handling of high profile cases. This has generated a widespread
recognition by both the bench and the bar that the effective judicial
management of these cases is required to maintain public confidence in our
justice system.
Effective judicial management of high profile cases is very difficult and
complicated. It includes judicial administration functions such as selection
of the "right" judge to handle the case, assignment of appropriate
courtroom and juror facilities, and, if necessary, broadcast facilities. It also
includes issuing directives to regulate the seating and conduct of the media
and spectators, and providing necessary security and special
accommodations for disabled individuals or others with special needs.
On a more substantive note, effective judicial handling of high profile
cases requires the proper resolution of issues arising from the demands of
the public and the media under the First Amendment to have access to
judicial proceedings and court records. These rights must be balanced
against the assertions by one or more of the parties that access should be
denied to protect the right to a fair trial guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment. The law governing these issues is extensive and evolving,
and substantial areas of uncertainty exist.

361. CAL. PENALCODE § 1122.5(a) (West 1998).
362. See id. at § 132.5(a).
363. See James R. Cady, Bouncing "Checkbook Journalism":A Balance Between the First
and SixthAmendment in High-Profile Criminal Cases, 4WM. &MARYBILOFRTS.J. 671,712-13

(1995).
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Besides denying access to court proceedings and court records under
appropriate circumstances, courts in high profile cases are often confronted
with the issue of whether to impose gag orders on the participants and their
attorneys, or on the media, to prevent prejudice. Courts in high profile
cases must therefore decide what standards govern the issuance of such
orders. In some cases, gag orders may be difficult to enforce, even with the
contempt powers; alternatively, they may be ineffective. In this case, the
court may encourage the parties to agree not to make extrajudicial
statements, or may direct the attorneys to comply with applicable ethics
code provisions limiting extrajudicial comments by attorneys in pending
cases.
The court's duty to minimize the effects of prejudicial publicity
requires it to control the trial and its atmosphere so that fairness and
impartiality are not compromised. This may require courts to permit
searching voir dire examination of prospective jurors, including individual
voir dire examination concerning prejudicial publicity issues. A court can
also change the venue of the trial, protect juror privacy during trial, and
regulate in-court conduct of the media and spectators, including placing
appropriate restrictions on televising the trial.
Real or perceived abuses concerning the extent and nature of publicity
in certain notable high profile cases have apparently resulted in several
recent judicial decisions denying media requests to televise trials. These
judicial decisions may signal abroad-based concern that the integrity of the
judicial process may have been jeopardized by excessive, prejudicial
publicity and that the appropriate balance between free press-fair trial
rights needs to be restored.
High profile cases will continue to play a significant role in the
American justice system. The challenges that these cases present to our
courts will also continue. This class of litigation is dynamic-it involves
some of our most importantjudicial doctrines in cases of great interest and
importance to our courts and our society. High profile cases will continue
to significantly impact judicial values and generate great public interest in
the administration ofjustice. For these reasons, our courts must constantly
seek to improve their ability to effectively manage high profile cases.
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